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Rights, Privileges, and Access to Information
Alina Ng*
Protecting property rights in creative works represents a classic
institutional approach to the specific economic problems of non-
rivalness and non-excludability of information. By providing the
copyright owner with an enforceable right against non-paying members
of society, copyright laws encourage the production and dissemination
of literary and artistic works to society for educational purposes.
Implicit in the grant of property rights is the assumption that
commercial incentives foster creative activity and productivity. In
recent years, literary and artistic works have increasingly become the
subject matter of exclusive property rights and control, particularly as
emerging technologies provide users of creative works with greater
access to informational goods. Despite the development of technologies
that enable broad access, the result of expanding property rights in
literary and artistic works has been higher access costs, which severely
restrict society's ability to access and use the information. This Article
examines society's claim to a right of access to information in order to
further the constitutional goal of promoting progress, and proposes that
the question of access to information is one of sustainable resource use
that should not evoke the exclusionary rights of a strict property rule.
Copyright laws protect economic privileges in information and govern
society's use of informational resources; however, they do not provide
copyright owners with a general right to exclude socially beneficial
uses of informational works. These laws are specifically tailored to
increase social welfare, and must be distinguished from a property right
to exclude others from use of a thing. Exclusionary property rights in
creative works arise, if at all, to protect an author's creative integrity,
validate the importance of authentic authorship, and provide personal
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and moral incentives for authors to produce creative works of social
value. Property rights and economic privileges, this Article proposes,
encourage the production of informational goods and are necessary to
ensure the advancement of science and the useful arts in accordance
with the constitutional goals of the copyright system.
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I. INTRODUCTION: RIGHTS IN INFORMATION
Ronald H. Coase's The Nature of the Firml and The Problem of
Social Cost2 are two pieces of work that have had a profound impact on
legal scholarship.3 The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences heralded
Coase's theories as "among the most dynamic forces behind research in
economic science and jurisprudence," when they awarded Coase the
Nobel Prize in 1991.4 Coase's contribution was significant because he
demonstrated in these two articles the role transaction costs play in both
the emergence of firms and institutional arrangements in the legal
system. In the first instance, firms exist because transaction costs-the
costs of negotiating contracts to their conclusion-make it cheaper for
an entrepreneur to organize various factors of production within a firm
than to form multiple contracts with each production unit and enter into
open-ended contracts that leave room for details to be agreed upon after
the general contract terms are concluded.5 In the second instance,
institutional arrangements in legal systems become necessary to allocate
resources when transaction costs prohibit market transactions from
occurring and achieving the optimal arrangement of rights.6 Instead, the
rights and duties of private individuals must be set by governmental
institutions when the cost of bringing about a contractual arrangement
on the market exceeds the value of production after the rearrangement.7
In his acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize, Coase emphasized this
pivotal point: the role of legal systems within an economy with positive
transaction costs is to determine individual rights and obligations so that
entitlements to perform legally permissible actions may be traded on the
market.8
1. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) [hereinafter Coase,
Nature of the Finn].
2. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase,
Social Cost].
3. Stewart J. Schwab, Coase's Twin Towers: The Relation Between The Nature of the Firm
and The Problem of Social Cost, 18 J. CORP. L. 359, 359 (1993) ("Much ink has been spilled over
[both] article[s]. Both are justly famous, and together they make Coase a richly deserving
recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics.").
4. Press Release, Royal Swedish Acad. of Sci., The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991 (Oct. 15, 1991), http://nobelprize.org/
nobel-prizes/economicslaureates/1991/press.html.
5. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 1, at 390-92.
6. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 2, at 16.
7. Id. at 15-17.
8. Ronald H. Coase, Prize Lecture: The Institutional Structure of Production, NOBEL PRIZE
(Dec. 9, 1991), http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economicslaureates/1991/coase-lecture.html.
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The importance of these articles to the field of economics is in their
demonstration that legal rights-whether they arise via contract or as
private property-define an individual's entitlement to use a production
resource without necessarily recognizing an inherent right in the
resource itself. A less well-known piece by Coase expands his ideas on
the role of institutional governance and property rights in encouraging
production of public goods and sheds light on the issue raised in this
Article: whether priyate property rights in literary and artistic works
protected by copyright laws allow right-holders to prevent society from
accessing information for uses that will promote progress in science and
the arts. Coase's The Lighthouse in Economics,9 published in 1974 by
the Journal of Law and Economics, sought to demonstrate that contrary
to conventional economic thinking at the time,10 government
intervention was not necessary to procure the production of public
goods if there are sufficiently well-defined property rights that allow a
private producer of a public good to recover or internalize positive
externalities generated by the production activity.'I The point Coase
makes in this article is important to the question here, because it
demonstrates that a state-granted property right over a given public
resource, such as information in creative works, serves to encourage the
private production of a public good. It allows private entities to recover
payment for the resource's use without necessarily entitling the right-
holder to control the resource as private property with an exclusionary
property right.
The question of access to information in copyright is often
inextricable from the question of rights in literary and artistic works,
because society's ability to use information to engage in civic discourse,
research, and social dialogue depends heavily on whether rights over
information can be used by right-holders to restrict access. When the
question of rights is couched within property-type metaphors in
conventional copyright talk, a right-holder appears entitled to prevent
access to information through an exclusionary right.12 By speaking of
9. Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974) [hereinafter
Coase, The Lighthouse].
10. Coase departed from traditional economic thinking at the time, which held that
government intervention in the form of a tax was necessary to reduce negative externalities, i.e.,
spillovers that are not accounted for in the price of the good produced, and which affect parties
external to the production of the good. Coase argued that to impose a tax upon the producer of
the externality would result in a reduction in the value of production. Coase, Social Cost, supra
note 2, at 42.
11. Coase, The Lighthouse, supra note 9, at 375.
12. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.,
concurring).
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the right to "exclude others" from using intellectual works, 13
analogizing information to land, 14 and thinking of copyright
infringement as "trespass" on the copyright owner's "exclusive
domain,"15 property rights in information seem to entail an exclusive
possessory right to information that entitles the right-holder to exclude
the rest of the world from the information. Yet, it remains unclear
whether information can accurately be thought of as property. 16
Property, in its conventional sense, is a finite and scarce resource, and
land, chattels, as well as personal items would fall within this traditional
understanding of property. Unlike finite and scarce resources,
information contained in literary and artistic works, like light from a
lighthouse, is non-rival (where use of the resource does not deplete it)
and non-excludable (where use of the resource cannot be limited once
made available to society) in consumption.17 One person's reading of
Victor Hugo's Les Mistrables does not diminish another person's
ability to read the novel and understand its story line, nor is anyone else
excluded from enjoying the narrative of the novel just because one
person has read it. This means that information contained in creative
works is, like light from a lighthouse, a public good-once made
publicly available, it may be consumed by society at zero marginal
13. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 419 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(explicating that the right to exclude in copyright law is not directed to an object in possession,
but is in vacuo); Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (explaining that an owner of a
copyright may refrain from vending of licensing and may simply exclude others from using his
property); White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18 (holding that music rolls were not copies within the
meaning of the Copyright Act).
14. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37-40 (2003) (likening the expansion of intellectual
property rights to the enclosure of common land in England); Michael Carrier, Cabining
Intellectual Property through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-8 (2004) (applying
property law limitations to intellectual property); Mark Rose, Copyright and Its Metaphors, 50
UCLA L. REv. 1, 6-8 (2002) (equating literary works to real estate).
15. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984)
(noting that anyone who trespasses on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner, as defined in
the statute, is a copright infringer); see also Wendy Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of
Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1343, 1366 (1989) (discussing the duty to refrain from copyright infringement and the duty
to stay away from another person's land).
16. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1744 (2007) ("At the core of controversies over the correct
scope of intellectual property lie grave doubts about whether intellectual property is property.").
17. Economists generally consider lighthouses to be the quintessential public good: a service
which can only be provided by the government by taxing the public. See Coase, The Lighthouse,
supra note 9, at 357 ("[Tlhe impossibility of securing payment from the owners of the ships that
benefit from the existence of the lighthouse makes it unprofitable for any private individual or
firm to build and maintain a lighthouse.").
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cost. 18 It is the public nature of literary and artistic goods that requires
production incentives in the form of state-granted property rights to
create the scarcity necessary to provide commercial value to such
goods, and in turn, their private production. 19 For without rights over
public goods, producers of public goods will lose their incentive to
make goods available to society if there is no way of recovering the
investment made in producing the good.20 Economic analyses of the
law justify property rights in literary and artistic works on the premise
that social benefits accruing from increased incentives to create (i.e.,
greater contribution to the collective pool of knowledge for progress)
outweigh the administrative and social burdens of protecting and
enforcing private property rights in creative works.21  However,
achieving a level of economic efficiency between providing the right
amount of incentives to maximize the production of informational
works, and ensuring that the level of legal protection does not raise the
cost of using information to a level where access is barred, remains
elusive.22
This Article argues that the balance between rights in and access to
information will remain elusive because the property metaphors we use
to conceptualize copyright and the boundaries we imagine around
informational resources mischaracterize the nature of information as the
subject matter of exclusive rights. As the subject matter of a property
right, information-being infinite, abundant, and boundless-does not
have to be protected from overuse. Unlike other forms of finite and
limited resources that are usually the subject matter of exclusive legal
rights (e.g., land, water, minerals, cattle or lobsters) where the
recognition of exclusive property rights aids in their conservation and
preservation,2 3 information need not be conserved or preserved from
18. Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 943,
955 (1998).
19. Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and
the Public Domain (pt. 1), 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 19-20 (1993) ("[I]ntellectual
property law tries exorcising the specter of information underproduction by granting exclusive
property rights to producers as incentives and rewards (producers can now charge for access to
their commodity), in exchange for anticipated social benefits arising from disclosure and
widespread access to such newly created information (justifying the property grant).").
20. Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment,
105 HARv. L. REV. 554, 563 (1991) (arguing that political speech has to be protected as a public
good, or else political information, like other forms of information, will be under-produced).
21. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
22. Id. ("Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is the central problem in
copyright law.").
23. See JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 142-44 (1998) (stating that
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overuse; being a public good, use of information as a resource does not
deplete it. Information bears greater similarity to air or light, the use of
which is a matter of experience rather than consumption, and is
therefore free to all.24 Property rights granted over information
encourage producers to create an abundance of informational resources
for social benefit, and are essentially different from property rights in
finite resources, which are granted to protect an abundant resource from
being depleted and becoming scarce from unregulated consumption or
overuse. For resources that exist in infinite forms, property rights serve
one specific purpose: to allow producers of the resource to recover their
investment in producing it. The economic value of property rights and
customary norms regulating use of finite and limited resources is in
their protection against the depletion or abuse of the resource. In that
situation, it makes perfect sense to employ a "right to exclude"
approach as a means of protecting a scarce resource that is susceptible
to exhaustion by excluding those who will lessen the value of the
resource.25  However, for infinite and unlimited resources such as
information, property rights serve to stimulate and foster productivity
by providing an incentive to produce and distribute the resource to
society. In this latter situation, any rights of exclusion are more limited
in application. Rather than define boundaries of ownership to prevent
socially wasteful conduct through exclusion, property rights in this
context provide a legally enforceable means of receiving payment for
the provision of a socially valuable good or service. Exercising a
property right in the case of informational goods, this Article suggests,
only allows the assertion of an entitlement to be paid for the provision
of a good and does not entail a possessory right to exclude society from
use of that resource.
The parallels between light and information production are
significant in this case. In The Lighthouse in Economics, Coase's
challenge to conventional economic assumption that lighthouses, being
the quintessential public good, could only be provided by taxing the
empirical studies suggest that with finite resources, property rights help to conserve the resource).
24. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions-knowledge,
truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary communication to others,
free as the air to common use."); see also Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 354-60
(1999) (arguing that information should be free to allow for free expression).
25. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1362-71 (1992)
(describing how the right to exclude is employed in private and communal land ownership to
reward labor and prevent overuse).
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public,26 suggests that public goods may be efficiently provided by
private enterprises as long as there are legally enforceable means of
recovering payment for their use from the public. Coase asserted that
lighthouses may be privately produced and provided, as long as there
are state-established and enforced property rights that would allow the
lighthouse owner to collect levies from vessels benefiting from the
lighthouse at the port without the lighthouse owner having to undertake
individual negotiations with vessels, or switch off the lighthouse when a
non-paying ship approaches its range, to achieve the excludability
necessary to make the provision of lighthouse services profitable. 27
Unlike land, light cannot be parceled out to achieve the exclusivity
necessary to receive payment for use.28  Economists similarly reason
that the provision of information requires laws to establish and enforce
property rights to sustain creative productivity by authors. As
information in literary and artistic works is limitless and infinite,
authors require state-established and enforced property rights to allow
them to prevent non-paying members of the public from free riding on
the provision of such works to paying members of society. 29 Copyright
legislation establishes the creator's exclusive rights in informational
goods and facilitates the private production of informational materials
by temporarily limiting public access to works.
But, when the recovery of financial investments for providing the
public with literary and artistic works is through the exercise of a
possessory right that entails a general right to exclude society from
using information, and which appears to take precedence over the
welfare of those relying on information produced, public access to
26. See also David E. Van Zandt, The Lessons of the Lighthouse: "Government" or "Private"
Provision of Goods, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 48 (1993) (arguing that history shows that institutions
providing lighthouse services relied more upon governmental assistance than other services and
goods); cf Elodie Bertrand, The Coasean Analysis of Lighthouse Financing: Myths and Realities,
30 CAMBRIDGE J. EcON. 389, 399-400 (2006) (arguing that Coase underestimated the role of
government in making the provision of lighthouse services profitable).
27. Coase, The Lighthouse, supra note 9, at 375.
28. See Elickson, supra note 25, at 1328-30 (explaining how technologies for marking
boundaries lead to increased parcelization of land).
29. See Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 328 ("[Without copyright protection,] anyone can
buy a copy of the book when it first appears and make and sell copies of it. The market price of
the book will eventually be bid down to the marginal cost of copying, with the unfortunate result
that the book probably will not be produced in the first place, because the author and publisher
will not be able to recover their costs of creating the work."); see also Robert M. Hurt & Robert
M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM. EcON. REv. 421, 421 (1966) ("A
copyright is a grant of the aid of state coercion to the creators of certain 'intellectual products' to
prevent for a period of years the 'copying' of these products.").
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informational goods becomes a social concern. 3 0 Progress and
advancement in the sciences and useful arts require incremental changes
towards a better or improved state, and are essentially contingent on the
availability of knowledge and information to guide those changes.31
Having reliable and valuable information available to society for
learning is, however, only a preliminary step in advancing the sciences
and arts. 32  The other necessary component in promoting progress is
providing society with the freedom to use information to develop new
forms of knowledge and information. 33 When information access costs,
which include transaction costs in the transfer of property rights,
become prohibitively high and deter efficient public use of information
to garner useful social knowledge, 34 use of information for the purposes
of generating new research and producing new knowledge is hampered.
Established research norms in the scientific community, for example,
require the sharing of knowledge as a matter of professional conduct to
make scientific knowledge accessible to achieve progress in the field.
These norms encourage scientists to test the veracity of claimed
observations and "contribute to the same body of certified knowledge,"
treat scientific findings as "a product of social collaboration . . .
dedicated to the scientific community," thirst for truth rather than
pursue self-interests, and verify all scientific claims before accepting
them as fact.35 The early disclosure of research findings has allowed
30. See Boyle, supra note 14, at 37-40 (calling the expansion of property rights over
intellectual works "the second enclosure movement").
31. See David W. Opderbeck, Deconstructing Jefferson's Candle: Towards a Critical Realist
Approach to Cultural Environmentalism and Information Policy, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 203, 235
(2009) (presenting a critical realist perspective that information has an ethical social dimension
that should be reflected in a robust information policy to ensure that the grant or restraint of
access to information will encourage the development of communities contributing towards
"human flourishing").
32. Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science
Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1058 (1997) ("The value of scientific
information . .. lies in its reliability.").
33. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1007-12 (1990) (arguing
that authors need access to a repository of knowledge to create new works of authorship).
34. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace-Rights Without laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1155, 1197 (1998) ("Acquiring licenses to use any particular information may involve
prohibitively high transaction costs and may prevent licensing from occurring in the first place.
The high transaction costs may increase the cost of information, and may, therefore, reduce the
accessibility of informational works.").
35. See Rebecca Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 182-83 (1987) (describing sociologist Robert Merton's observation
of four interrelated behavioral norms of universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and
organized skepticism within the scientific community).
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scientists to benefit from the research work of other scientists. 36 As
research indicates that lighthouse services in England in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries were poor in quality for a variety of reasons-
two important reasons being the private individual's drive to maximize
profits from the provision of light and the lack of quality control by the
state 37-there is a need in present times to ensure that the maximization
of private profits through the copyright system does not undermine
society's ability to use information for learning. Lighthouse service
dues imposed by private individuals were high because part of the dues
were paid to the King, whose favor was constantly courted by private
individuals seeking a lighthouse patent. 38 While producers of literary
and artistic works need no longer court the Crown or society's nobility
to support their work, 39 the financial gains from the market, as the new
patron for commissioning the production of creative works, may
subjugate the public's interest in accessing accurate and unbiased
informational content, as producers of information seek to maximize
their profits from the commercialization of their works on the market.40
This Article argues that it is imperative to define the legal
entitlements that the copyright owner and society have over
informational goods to determine the extent to which copyright owners
may exclude society from using literary and artistic works for research,
civic discourse, and social dialogue to achieve progress in the sciences
and useful arts. The question of access is, arguably, most accurately
analyzed by characterizing information as a resource for learning and
knowledge development that is the subject matter of various use
privileges rather than of an exclusive right of ownership. Property
36. See, e.g., id. at 226-28 (describing the communication and sharing of biological materials
between the National Cancer Institute, Bethesda, Maryland and the Pasteur Institute, Paris, which
eventually led to the discovery of the AIDS virus and the development of an AIDS antibody test
kit).
37. See Bertrand, supra note 26, at 398-400 (detailing the circumstances that contributed to
the poor maintenance of lighthouses). Contributing factors to poor lighthouse services include a
lack of technical control of the quality of lighthouse buildings, the lack of regulations requiring
inspection of lighthouse construction and maintenance, and the need to obtain the Crown's favor
before building a lighthouse. Id. at 399.
38. It is noted that James I, for example, granted lighthouse patents to private enterprises to
"increase his own fortune." Id. at 400.
39. See Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, I ECONOMICA 167, 170
(1934) ("The belief has been widely held that professional authorship depends for its continued
existence upon this copyright monopoly; or upon an alternative which is considered worse viz.
patronage.").
40. See Boyle, supra note 14, at 50-52 (explaining the need for creators of information to
exert greater control over consumers in the aftermarket and describing the effect on access to
information).
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rights in information, as commonly understood, encourage both its
creation and public dissemination41 and do not aid in its conservation
from depletion through overuse because of the naturally abundant
nature of information as a quintessential public good. Protecting a
property right in unlimited resources, such as information, serves a
completely different purpose from protecting a property right in scarce
resources. Therefore, the need to acknowledge property rights as
serving a production-rather than conservation-function when it
comes to informational resources is great. One of the most problematic
consequences of treating rights in information as serving a conservation
function, rather than a production function, is the creation of competing
exclusionary claims that authors, copyright owners, and users of literary
and artistic works may assert over information resulting in the excessive
fragmentation of ownership rights and the under-use of informational
resources as raw materials for progress of the sciences and useful arts.42
Part II of this Article examines the rights-access debate and argues
that the tension between the grant of copyright and the need for public
access is attributable to the influence of law and economics and
American legal realism in copyright jurisprudence, both of which
downplay the in rem nature of property rights by emphasizing economic
efficiency and political influence in the creation of rights, and
undermine the rights of the author as the creator and owner of literary
and artistic works. The effect of these schools of thought on copyright
law is the emergence of a narrow and specific conception of property
rights in literary and artistic works that views rights in literary and
artistic works as a bundle of positive use rights in informational
resources that resonates with in personam rights governing specific
legal relationships and activities in society. Due to the specific origins
of statutory copyright in economic analysis and utilitarian thinking, the
rights-access debate over entitlements in literary and artistic works
would, therefore, be more accurately couched as a question of use
privileges over a resource that is shared between the owner of a
41. Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and
the Public Domain (pt. 2), 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 191, 192 (1993-1994) ("[C]opyright
laws ... grant property rights to creators in order to encourage disclosure and dissemination of
new creations for aggregate social benefit.").
42. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621, 677 (1998) (arguing that when many private
individuals are able to exercise a right of exclusion over the use of a scarce resource, the tragedy
of the anticommons, i.e., that rational individuals acting separately may waste a resource by
under-consuming it, may occur).
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copyright and society rather than the extent to which private property
rights over creative works entitle the denial of access to information.
Part III of this Article explains that the question of ownership rights
in a particular "thing," which imposes a general impersonal duty of
abstention on society, is separate and distinct from the use privileges
inadvertently brought to the forefront of copyright jurisprudence by law
and economics and American legal realism. The distinction between
the in rem right in creative works and the in personam use privileges
over informational resources is, this Article suggests, observable as a
matter of historical fact from the earliest conception of copyright as
solely a right to print; of economic theory from the perspective of
controlling and reducing information costs in the protection of literary
and artistic works; and of legal principle from the distinctions the law
draws between protectable expressions and non-protectable ideas, and
between illegal copying and fair uses of creative works. Part IV of this
Article explores how an explicit acknowledgment of this distinction
between in rem rights and in personam privileges changes the rights-
access debate in copyright law by protecting and conserving the
author's creative personality to encourage creative productivity, and
facilitating production and dissemination of information for use in
scientific and artistic progress.
Part V presents a normative proposal: that the author's rights to his
literary and artistic creation must be protected with a right to exclude
society from using a "thing" if society's use of it adversely affects the
author's creative personality. If copyright law is serious about
encouraging the progress of society through the copyright system, the
law must acknowledge the pivotal role of the author in creating works
that promote the progress and advancement of society. Part VI
concludes by revisiting the analogy of information as a lighthouse to
highlight that information contained in literary and artistic works, like
light from a lighthouse, may be costly to produce. High production
costs require "property rights" in these situations to protect an economic
privilege to recover payment for the provision of a public good. But
these privileges are not property rights of the in rem kind, which serve
to conserve and protect scarce resources from depletion, and must be
clearly distinguished from them.
II. DEFINING THE RIGHTS-ACCESS DEBATE
Defining the central problem in copyright law is a useful starting
point to begin thinking about information as a resource for progress and
development that is subjected to various use privileges rather than
exclusive possessory rights. By granting exclusive rights in literary and
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artistic works to copyright owners, the law has inadvertently reduced
society's ability to use information freely. 43 British poet, historian, and
politician, Sir Thomas Babington Macaulay, resisted the expansion of
the copyright term in England in 1841 and referred to copyright as a
"tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers," but
acknowledged the necessity of "giving a bounty to genius and learning"
and "willingly submit[ted] to this severe and burdensome tax."44 Three
hundred years after the first copyright act was passed, rights continue to
expand despite increasing pushback from society against the
encroachment of rights into the sphere containing free information for
general use in the public domain. 45 This continuous expansion of rights
suggests that there is an inherent economic value in literary and artistic
works, which copyright owners try to capture from society by asserting
exclusive possessory rights against all members of society.46
Information creates wealth because it gives its owner advantage and
power over others by providing the necessary intelligence to out-
perform competitors in the market, guide strategic decision making, and
direct economic growth.47 When exclusive rights are granted in
information, they provide the owner with exclusive control over who is
permitted to use the information, when the information may be used,
and how the information is used.
43. See William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An
Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1, 6-7 (2000) (identifying access cost as one of the
costs of copyright protection, the other being the administrative and enforcement cost of the
system).
44. Thomas Babington Macaulay, A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons on the 5th of
February, 1841, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 309, 311 (Robert P. Merges &
Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2004).
45. See Litman, supra note 33, at 970-84 (detailing the history of copyright law); see also
Boyle, supra note 14, at 37 (explaining that copyright law signifies the second enclosure
movement despite opponents' assertions that knowledge is for everyone, and the consequences of
privatizing knowledge are dreadful).
46. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEx. L. REv.
1031, 1033-46 (2005) (arguing that copyright does not allow creators of literary and artistic
works to capture the full social value of their work, and that free riding on the social benefits of
literary and artistic works is not inherently wrong).
47. See Anthony T. Kronmant, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 496
(1980) (stating that a person's wealth includes information and that "[i]f we prohibit someone
from exploiting potentially valuable information or skills (for example, the skill of deception) we
thereby decrease his wealth just as surely as if we were to take some money from his bank
account and burn it or transfer it into a common fund").
48. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REv. 129, 144 (2004) ("[I]f we gave only one person control over a particular type of
information, that person would restrict the flow of information, raise its price, and make more
money than providers do in a competitive market.").
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In a knowledge-based economy, however, economic growth is
dependent not only on the production and dissemination of information
to society but also on society's ability to generate new wealth from
existing forms of information.49  Information, after all, represents new
wealth that individuals acquire through resourceful thinking and
creativity. The growth of private equity financing in the form of
venture capital to fund early stage, high-potential start-up companies
with the intention of generating a return on investment through an initial
public offering, or by way of eventual acquisition by a larger company,
for example, is evidence of the investment value of technological know-
how and knowledge as a source of wealth. 50 But as information
becomes an increasingly valuable resource in the knowledge economy,
producers of information seek greater rights to control society's use of
information.5 1
Control of information as "property" creates concentrated power for
the "owner" of information as the rest of society is prevented from
using information as a necessary resource for development and
progress. 52  The arguments used to justify these rights in information,
whether efficiency,53 reward,54 or incentive based, emphasize the
49. Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REv. 257, 314 (2006) ("Development must entail not
only economic growth, but also a life that is culturally fulfilling. . . . The United Nations'
conception of a 'Knowledge Society' articulates this understanding of development. As a U.N.
report puts it, 'at its best, the Knowledge Society involves all members of a community in
knowledge creation and utilization.' Hence, 'the Knowledge Society is not only about
technological innovations, but also about human beings, their personal growth, and their
individual creativity, experience and participation."').
50. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Securities Regulation of Private Offerings in the Cyberspace
Era: Legal Translation, Advertising and Business Context, 37 U. TOL. L. REv. 331, 338 (2006)
(stating that venture capital financing supports start-up companies by providing seed and start-up
funds that grow the company and assist in the development of their technology).
51. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin
of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 443, 475-76 (2001).
52. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 380-81 (1999) (arguing that the power
to control informational resources through "state enforce[d] property rules that give ... a veto
power, backed by a credible threat of state force over their use," will undermine political
discourse).
53. See William W. Fisher M, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1659, 1699-717 (1988) (using economic efficiency as a method of economic analysis to analyze
the fair use doctrine); Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 21,
at 325 (questioning the extent to which copyright may be explained as a means for "promoting
efficient allocation of resources"); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright
Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1045, 1058-61 (1989) (analyzing legal
protection for computer application programs as an efficient allocation of resources where
markets fail).
54. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant . . . copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
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right of the owner to exert control over social uses of information.56
The emphasis on owner rights control, however, creates a conflict
between competing legal values as the ability to control social uses of
information contradicts society's ideals of freedom and liberty to use a
free resource for development and creative production.57
Protecting entitlements in information as "property" allows
possessory rights to expand as new markets develop with technological
innovation because the physical limitations of a scarce and finite
resource, such as land, do not exist for an infinite and boundless
resource such as information. For example, property rights over
Blackacre cannot expand because they are necessarily limited by the
physicality of the land, but rights over information may be expanded as
and when the owner of a copyright convinces lawmakers that there is a
need to capture positive externalities from the market because there are
no physical limitations to the extent rights may exist.58 When copyright
owners claim a possessory right to control use of information by
excluding society in a manner that should only be applied to scarce and
limited resources, they assert a general right of exclusion that prevents
the emergence of new markets; as new technologies create new ways to
access and use information, 59 the rights-access debate has now become
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare ... . Sacrificial days devoted to
such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered."), superseded
by statute, 37 C.F.R. 202.10(c) (1959); see also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement
in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997) ("Intellectual Property is
fundamentally about incentives to invent and create.").
55. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984) ("The
purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort."); see also Stewart E. Sterk,
Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1197, 1248 (1996) ("Extensive copyright
protection, then, is quite consistent with the popular notion that the market system rewards the
deserving.").
56. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free
Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1887-909 (2000) (describing how corporate entities
strategically manage content portfolios to stifle uses of their content and skew public discourse).
57. See Sunder, supra note 49, at 315 ("Intellectual property rights ... were foundationally
understood as limited exclusive rights, and offered by the state not to reward private persons but
to promote the public interest in art and science.").
58. Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term
Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2343 (2003)
(describing how copyright extension is a prime example of rent-seeking by copyright holders
extracting legislation from the political system).
59. Neil Weinstock Netanel, New Media in Old Bottles? Barron's Contextual First
Amendment and Copyright in the Digital Age, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 952, 976 (2008)
(describing how commercial media incumbents enforce rights against new technology media
resulting in a number of new media, such as MP3.com, peer-to-peer file trading systems and user-
generated video sites, being enjoined from infringing copyright and driven out of business when
the incumbent refuses to license their rights).
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a critical legal problem in the copyright system. A more nuanced view
of property rights-one that separates the governance of free resources
for the purposes of encouraging production from an exclusionary right
to preserve or conserve a limited and finite resource-must form the
core of the debate.60 By extrapolating these nuances in property law
from copyright jurisprudence it may be demonstrated that the statutory
rights in the copyright system are in personam rights, or privileges, to
use literary and artistic works, which are separate and distinct
entitlements from an in rem right, grounded in the work itself, to
exclude society from using property. The dominance of two schools of
thought-law and economics and American legal realism-in copyright
jurisprudence have minimized the in rem nature of property rights in
literary and artistic works by emphasizing economic efficiency and
political influence in the creation and protection of rights, thereby
undermining the author as the creator and first owner of property in
literary and artistic works, and overlooking the notion of authorship as a
central component of progress of the sciences and useful arts in the
copyright system.
The legal distinction between possessory rights of exclusion (used to
conserve scarce resources) and economic privileges to use and control
resources (used to govern various use rights and encourage the
production and dissemination of a non-rival and non-exclusive
resource) has yet to be drawn in copyright jurisprudence. 61 The failure
to recognize this distinction has immense implications for the copyright
system because the statutorily granted rights are specifically designed
and carefully laid out to ensure that the copyright owner recovers
payment for uses of the work. The rights provided for under the
Copyright Act do not include a possessory right in rem that would allow
copyright owners to deny society access to information contained in
literary and artistic works because the rights provided for by the
copyright system are in personam in nature, which protect a personal
claim for payment against a person who uses the work. The
entitlements created by the Copyright Act provide copyright owners
with economic privileges to use and control informational resources in a
60. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1817-21 (2007) (discussing intellectual property and the use of
a mix of exclusion and governance strategies for defining property boundaries, and arguing that
there should be a presumption of an exclusion strategy where information costs necessitates
bright-line delineation of rights).
61. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(a) (West 2010) (protecting the right of the author to claim
authoriship of her visual work, the right to prevent use of her name for a work she did not create,
and the right to prevent the work from being intentionally destroyed, mutilated, or modified).
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specific way to encourage creativity and public dissemination of works,
which is consistent with economic dogma that the market will provide
the greatest reward for creativity. Specifically granted rights to use
information do not invoke a general property right to exclude society
from accessing and using informational resources for progress because
they are granted to deal with a specific problem: encouraging
investment in producing creative resources that, once made available to
the public, cannot be controlled except through legal means. The right
to make reproductions of copyrighted works, for example, allows for
more specific arrangements and efficient use of informational resources
to be made through contractual negotiations 62 and must be
conceptualized as a form of statutory privilege complementing a more
general possessory right to exclude that imposes a negative duty on
society to refrain from using the work. The right to exclude applies in a
uniform manner to everyone in society by clear boundaries, delineated
to mark ownership of the work and to communicate behavioral
expectations about the work in a socially functional way. 63 As the right
to exclude is intended to delineate boundaries around a specific object
subject to ownership rights, this right should belong only to the author
or creator of the work as a form of property right to protect the integrity
of the work as a manifestation of the author's personality and
communicate behavioral expectations or normative standards on the
production and use of the work.
Couching the problem at the core of the rights-access debate in
copyright law as a jurisprudential oversight of the legal distinction
between a possessory property right of exclusion, which protects scarce
resources to conserve them, and economic privileges, which govern
uses of information to encourage their creation, offers greater clarity for
analyzing the question of access to information. A jurisprudential slip,
which treats both rights in information and privileges to use information
as the same thing, will cause practical difficulties in determining how
informational resources may be used by society for progress,
development, and creative production. Appropriate social access to
information, for the purpose of advancing science and useful arts,
depends on recognizing that property rights in information should only
62. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 773, 797 (2001) ("Allowing in rem property rights to be supplemented by in personam
contract rights, in particular, introduces an enormously larger set of options for the use and
control of resources than would be possible using exclusion alone.").
63. Id. at 795 ("Exclusion rules represent a simple and universal 'organizing idea' that allows
a multitude of individuals with a small amount of information to interact in mutually beneficial
ways that would be impossible in a world that has only governance rules.").
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exclude society when public use of creative works affects an author's
creative personality adversely, in which case a general right to exclude
may legitimately be used.64  Uses of informational resources for
progress would be, arguably, uses that are generally allowed by in
personam privileges as long as payment is made to the provider of the
information for producing and disseminating the work, or if permission
to use without making the necessary payment is obtained from the
copyright owner. As copyright markets tend towards failure, 65 which in
turn generates legislative responses to correct that failure in the form of
"rights," 66 and as new technologies increase society's access to literary
and artistic works to enable greater participation in civil dialogue,
political discourse, and creative production, the need for a more precise
articulation of entitlements to resolve the question of rights and access
to information has become urgent.
A. Market Economics
The expansion of rights over literary and artistic works is propagated,
to a large extent, by the economics of the copyright market. As markets
for copyrighted materials usually fail because creative works are
considered public goods67 that are non-excludable and non-rival in
consumption, 68 an accurate correlation between production costs and
64. This involves a discussion on the moral rights of authors, which have limited explicit
recognition under copyright laws in the United States, save for § 106A, which protects the moral
rights of attribution and integrity for works of visual arts. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (2010)
(protecting an author of visual work from adverse consequences).
65. Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1607-08 (1982) (noting markets
fail for three reasons: (1) costs and benefits are not internal to the transaction that generated them;
(2) there is imperfect knowledge; and (3) the presence of transaction costs). Because the
production of literary and artistic works will always produce benefits external to the production
process, it is often difficult to have perfect knowledge about a copyrighted work. Orphan works,
for example, lack pertinent information about the creation of the work, and transaction costs will
always exist in negotiating use rights. Thus, there is a tendency for the copyright market to fail
because of these characteristics.
66. Id. at 1612 (proposing that state-created property rights correct market failure by allowing
the market to function and providing a means to exclude non-purchasers).
67. Scholars have explored the idea that literary and artistic works are not pure public goods
because they do not exhibit a systematic bias towards underproduction and are not bounded away
from providing efficient level of utilization. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public
Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 675-77 (2007) (explaining
the theory of impure public goods after noting that classifying goods as purely private or public
misses the point that goods often fall somewhere in between the two polar extremes). This
Article assumes that literary and artistic works are public goods that are non-rival and non-
exclusive in consumption and does not make the more specific distinctions between pure and
impure public goods.
68. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer
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market price cannot be achieved because of the indeterminacy of
consumer demand caused by externalities. 69  Once creative works are
publicly disseminated, non-paying members of the public cannot be
excluded from use of the work and the work, even if used by a wide
segment of the public, will not deplete through overuse. Rights, as
neoclassical economists argue, provide the mechanism by which the
social value for literary and artistic works may be appropriated through
a market-set price, which would off-set the fixed and marginal costs
incurred in production and dissemination. 70  United States copyright
jurisprudence has generally accepted neoclassical economics as the
predominant theoretical approach to allocating entitlements in literary
and artistic works71 by granting first property rights to the author, as the
creator or producer of literary and artistic works.72 Thereafter, the law
allows and facilitates negotiations and bargaining for use of the work to
take place through the free market at a price and under terms set by, and
agreed upon, the author and subsequent owners of the work.
However, because the production of public goods will always
produce externalities, and as the idea of unrecovered spillover benefits
from the production and dissemination of creative works is considered
objectionable to many copyright owners,74 the owners seek to expand
File Sharing, 17 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 24 (2003) (stating that copyright laws aim to solve a
systematic market failure, which is the under supply of creative expressions that have the
characteristics of a public good).
69. Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 387, 417 (2001) (discussing market pricing for public goods in the
securities industry).
70. See Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The Tenuous Connection Between Land
and Copyright, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 426 (2005) (describing the views of neoclassical
economists).
71. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
311-12 (1996) ("Neoclassicism has ascended to prominence during the last three decades-a
period of marked intellectual property expansion-with the Chicago school's application of
economic analysis to legal institutions. Neoclassical economics views a system of universally
applied and clearly defined property rights as a cornerstone of market efficiency. As we shall see,
it is the neoclassical sense of allocative efficiency, with its reification of claims to market
potential, its emphasis on universal, concentrated, exclusive, and exchangeable property rights,
and its subordination of law to market ideals that helps to spur copyright's untoward
expansion.").
72. 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(a) (West 2010).
73. Id. § 201(d).
74. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemiey, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 257, 267 (2007)
("The obvious implication of the property rights theory is that spillovers are bad, since they drive
a wedge between private and social value and prevent the perfectly informed inventor from
making optimal decisions. From the supply side, spillovers are uncaptured benefits that could be
captured to increase incentives to invest, and from the demand side, spillovers reflect unobserved,
lost signals of consumer demand that fail to guide investment and management decisions.").
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rights to capture portions of the market where there are unrecovered
benefits and thereby prevent non-paying members of society from "free
riding" on the investment the author or copyright owner made.75
Additionally, courts have consistently held that the temporary cost of
the monopoly right, regardless of how long the right lasts,76 justifies the
social end the law seeks to achieve, namely the promotion of progress in
the sciences and useful arts.7 But, the creation and dissemination of a
work only benefit society and advance progress when the costs of
negotiating for use of a work are not prohibitively high and do not
preclude the work's creator from engaging in negotiations that will
produce the socially optimal behavior with respect to the intellectual
work. Harold Demsetz's Toward a Theory of Property Rights theorizes
that the development of property rights in communal resources will
allow the owner of the resource to economize on social uses of that
resource by exercising the right to exclude others from using the
resource.78  While economists' primary rationale for protecting
intellectual property as an integral part of the property right system may
find basis in Demsetz's article,79 the link drawn between Demsetz's
article on property rights and intellectual property may be tenuous.80
Demsetz reasons that unless a resource owner has the right to exclude
others from using the particular resource, he is unlikely to be able to
evaluate the effect of the use of his resource, in terms of the social costs
75. Lemley, supra note 46, at 1043-45 (describing how the general objection to free riding
has caused intellectual property laws to expand to cover all social uses of intellectual property).
76. The Supreme Court has held that it is not up to courts, but rather Congress, to determine
the duration of copyright protection. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 213 (2003) ("[I]t is
generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's
objectives . . . [and the] evolution of the duration of copyright protection tellingly illustrates the
difficulties Congress faces . . . . [I]t is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress has
labored to achieve." (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990))).
77. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."').
78. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354-59
(1967).
79. Lemley, supra note 46, at 1037-38 (explaining the use of private ownership as an
economic solution to the tragedy of the commons and citing Demsetz's work as establishing
property rights as being valuable to society because they limit the presence of uncompensated
externalities).
80. The link is tenuous because intellectual property does not present the same problem of
conserving scarce resources with which Demsetz's work was concerned. Intellectual property
laws create the scarcity to give market value to an innovation or creative work. See Lemley,
supra note 46, at 1055 ("If property law is the creation of barriers to entry, as Demsetz suggests,
the question is whether those barriers are properly scaled to the problem. But solving the
'problem' of intellectual property does not require complete internalization of externalities.").
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and benefits (or externalities) the particular use imposes or brings, upon
the rights of other members of the community to undertake the
development of the resource. 8 1 The grant of a general right to exclude
by way of property law is, using this economic reasoning, an ideal way
of encouraging the production and dissemination of literary and artistic
works to the public by providing exclusive personal and economic gains
to authors and inventors who undertake creative and innovative
activities to advance public welfare in the form of an ability to control
general social uses of the work.82
The economic view of property rights just described eliminates a
necessary connection between the owner of a right to exclude and the
"thing" owned, and instead focuses primarily on property rights as a
collective bundle of use and enjoyment rights in a particular resource
that would allow the resource to be put to its most efficient use.
Property rights in this sense define the owner's rights in a resource vis-
A-vis his or her relationship with other members of society rather than
the resource owned. The right to sell or give something away is a right
that will create a relationship of seller-buyer in a contract, or donor-
donee in a bequest. These relationships of seller-buyer and donor-donee
determine behavioral and legal norms among members of a society
without necessarily making a normative connection between the owners
of a property right with a particular thing that is owned. Professor Tom
Grey's commentary in The Disintegration of Property, in Liberty,
Property and the Law, illustrates the disconnection between ownership
of a property right and ownership in a thing that is prevalent in the line
of property rights and economic thought stemming from Professor
Demsetz's article:
[D]iscourse about property has fragmented into a set of discontinuous
usages. The more fruitful and useful of these usages are those
stipulated by theorists; but these depart drastically from each other and
from common speech. Conversely, meanings of "property" in law that
cling to their origin in the thing-ownership conception are integrated
least successful into the general doctrinal framework of law, legal
theory, and economics. It seems fair to conclude from a glance at the
range of current usages that the specialists who design and manipulate
the legal structures of the advanced capitalist economics could easily
81. Demsetz, supra note 78, at 356 ("[P]rivate ownership of land will internalize many of the
external costs associated with communal ownership, for now an owner, by virtue of his power to
exclude others, can generally count on realizing the rewards associated with husbanding the game
and increasing the fertility of his land. This concentration of benefits and costs on owners creates
incentives to utilize resources more efficiently.").
82. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219 (noting that the primary consideration of copyright law is to
promote the general welfare, and the secondary consideration is to reward the author).
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do without using the term "property" at all . .. [t]he development of a
largely capitalist market economy toward industrialism objectively
demand formulation of its emergent system of economic entitlements
in something like the bundle-of-rights form, which in turn must lead to
the decline of property as a central category of legal and political
thought.83
This Article argues that the emergence of property rights as a bundle
of economic entitlements and the disconnection between ownership
rights and property rights in a thing owned, has facilitated the expansion
of rights in literary and artistic works because the economist's
conception of "property rights" need no longer be tied to a thing with
delineated bright-line boundaries, and may expand to cover new uses of
creative resources as developing technologies open new markets to
allow for greater social use of creative works. Unlike the conventional
notion of property rights in a thing owned, which is generally limited to
the physicality of the thing, the economic conception of property rights
as a bundle of rights is flexible and expandable to allow for the capture
of all forms of externalities arising from technological development. 84
It is this economic conception of property as a loose bundle-of-rights,
which provides copyright owners with the philosophical basis to lobby
for expanded rights in literary and artistic works as new markets emerge
to provide users of creative works with new ways of using and sharing
literary and artistic content. 5  As rights in the law and economics
tradition are not tied to the physicality of the thing owned, there are no
conceptual or philosophical restraints to prevent rights from expanding
with emerging markets in literary and artistic works as a result of
technological development. The benefit of expanding rights, for the
copyright owner, is a greater control over markets for literary and
artistic content without undertaking the responsibilities of developing
works for the purposes of progress of science and arts.86
Allowing rights to expand over society's use of creative works as
new markets emerge provides an added advantage to the copyright
owner. By allowing copyright to expand, the law has decided to put the
83. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in MODERN UNDERSTANDINGS OF
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 291, 294-95 (Richard A. Epstein ed., Garland Pub. 2000).
84. J.E. Penner, The "Bundle-of-Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 723-24
(1996) (noting that the concept of "property" as a bundle of rights is a "flexible one, without any
necessary defining features").
85. Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformation of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L. REV.
1395, 1459-60 (1996) (describing the expansion of copyright laws in tandem with technological
change).
86. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 872-73 (2001).
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initial entitlement in literary and artistic works in the hands of copyright
owners and allowed the market to facilitate efficient outcomes in
transferring user rights in literary and artistic works to the respective
users interested in using the work. But this assumes that the party who
values the right to use the work most is willing to pay the price for the
particular right to use the work in a market where the absence of
transaction costs makes transferring rights possible. The faith that the
copyright system places on the market to effectively transfer rights is
questionable because the market for literary and artistic works, as
demonstrated, is susceptible to failure. Private rights provide an
economic benefit to the copyright owner by establishing entitlements to
use the work in the manner defined under the Copyright Act. But, as
Ronald Coase theorized, these rights may only secure optimal outcomes
in a perfect market as prohibitively high transaction costs will prevent
rational actors from naturally negotiating transfers of entitlements to the
party who values it most after the initial allocation of the entitlement
has been made. 87 If the most efficient outcome may be achieved
through the market, regardless of how the rights are initially allocated,
then it does not matter how much rights expand with the development
of new markets from new technologies because all parties with an
interest in the right to use the work will naturally negotiate the purchase
of that right. The initial allocation of the right to use the work in a
particular way to the copyright owner as technology develops and new
markets emerge does not matter to the economist, because the market
will facilitate the transfer of the rights to use the work to paying
members of society.
However, society's adverse reaction and push-back to the expansion
of rights in literary and artistic works today seems to suggest that
Coasean bargains may be failing in leading society to the most socially
optimal outcomes.88 This may be attributable to the increasing liberties
that the Internet and digital technologies afford users of literary and
artistic works. Users of literary and artistic works, with digital
technology and new media reproduction programs, no longer seem to be
mere passive consumers, but rather active creators and reproducers of
the works they use. 89 As the autonomy of individual members of
87. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 2, at 15-18 (arguing that many disputes are not addressed
because of the high transactional costs associated with the resolution).
88. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.J. 31, 95-98 (1991) (describing circumstances when Coasean bargains fail).
89. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 579 (2000) (arguing
that the legislature should make policy choices, which conceive users of creative works as also
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society grows for various uses of creative works beyond the control of
the copyright owner, Coasean bargains become less likely. The socially
optimal outcome desired through the grant of legal rights in literary and
artistic works to the copyright owner may be elusive, because the legal
structure of entitlements in literary and artistic works creates
prohibitively high transaction costs that cause negotiations to break
down. Where markets fail to facilitate the transfer of entitlement from
the copyright owner to the user of the work, the courts may be required
to artificially create an efficient market by forcing a transfer of
entitlements. 90  In this situation, the economic entitlement of the
copyright owner will be protected by a liability rule, rather than a
property rule, where the courts will attach an objective value to the
work and require the copyright infringer to pay the copyright owner
damages for unauthorized uses of the work.91 But as long as the law
allocates first entitlements in literary and artistic works to the copyright
owner, rights will continue to expand as technology develops to protect
the rights of the copyright owner against infringing uses.
B. Peer Production and Social Networks
Scholars often attribute the emergence of early copyright laws to the
printing press.92  Ironically, the technology that allowed books to be
printed cheaply and disseminated to a wide segment of society, thereby
necessitating laws governing public use of information, is the very same
technology that allowed education and learning to flourish through
greater public access to information. 93  Technological development
producers of content, participating as "peers" in a "robust, open social conversation").
90. Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J.
1335, 1336 (1986) ("When a court cannot avail itself of the Coasean market, it is left to imagine
what the parties would have agreed to in a hypothetical-Coasean market. In this market, the right
to use a resource would have been secured ultimately by that party who would have paid the most
for it. The court then mimics the outcome of the idealized, but unrealized Coasean market by
'auctioning' entitlements to those who value them most-as judged by each litigant's willingness
to pay.").
91. Guido Calebresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1106-09 (1972).
92. See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 3 (1993)
("[Clopyright-the practice of securing marketable rights in texts that are treated as
commodities-is a specifically modem institution, the creature of the printing press, the
individualization of authorship in the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance, and the
development of the advanced marketplace society in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.").
93. The intellectual community in Venice, for example, grew because of the printing industry.
See JANE A. BERNSTEIN, PRINT CULTURE AND MUSIC IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY VENICE 15
(2001) ("Printers and booksellers forged important alliances with members of the intellectual
world of Venice. Their business distinguished them from other merchants by bringing them into
contact with writers, artists, and musicians.").
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always provides reasons to reassess the effectiveness of incentives by
encouraging the production of literary and artistic works because new
technologies often offer greater public accessibility of creative works
and heighten the free-rider problem of public goods, creating an urgent
need for information producers to internalize the additional social
benefits created through increased accessibility. 94 As producers of
information seek to prevent the proliferation of new technologies by
claiming that producers of new technologies are contributorily liable for
copyright infringement because these technologies facilitate
infringement of copyrighted works, 95 the legal system confronts a
difficult question of law that remains unresolved: whether the rights
provided to copyright owners under the Copyright Act may be used to
prevent the public distribution of new technologies and protect markets
when the economic justification for the grant of the right in the first
place was to ensure the production of literary and artistic works for
public benefit.
It is difficult to conceive that the statutory rights in the copyright
system were intended to be so broad as to allow for right owners to
exert rights and prevent the development of burgeoning technologies.
To allow these exclusive rights, granted to fulfill a larger public goal of
progress, to stifle development in any form would appear irrational. Yet
the exercise of statutory rights has had the effect of dismantling
developing technologies. The Grokster website today displays a
message, which states: "[t]he United States Supreme Court unanimously
confirmed that using this service to trade copyrighted material is illegal.
Copying copyrighted motion picture and music files using unauthorized
peer-to-peer services is illegal and is prosecuted by copyright owners."
The site goes on to say, "[t]here are legal services for downloading
music and movies. This service is not one of them"96-a result of the
Supreme Court's decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., where the Court decided that Grokster and StreamCast
Networks, distributors of free file sharing programs on peer-to-peer
networks that allowed personal computers to communicate directly with
each other without a centralized server, were liable for contributory
94. Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Finn, 112 YALE L.J.
369, 415-27 (2002) (describing large-scale collaborative projects for information production that
do not depend on markets or managerial hierarchy as a result of the availability of free software).
95. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984) (stating that
contributory infringement lies outside statutory copyright and is established by showing: (1) the
"'contributory' infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others"; and
(2) "had authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner").
96. GROKSTER, http://www.grokster.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
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infringement for the infringing activities of the users of their software.
Both companies, the Court held, went beyond mere distribution of the
program to taking affirmative steps to encourage and foster copyright
infringement by teaching their users how to play copyrighted content
and actively urged their users to download copyrighted works.97
The Grokster decision has important implications because the
balance between the exclusive rights of copyright owners against the
equally legitimate public right to technological development the Court
was required to make demonstrates that the protection of rights in
literary and artistic works may abridge legitimate social expectations to
use works as a resource for research, education, or, as in this case,
entertainment. The rights of copyright owners were obviously affected
by mass downloads and distribution of copyrighted content: a
statistician employed by MGM showed that 90% of downloaded
materials were copyrighted. 98  But, the active encouragement of
technology developers to use their technology to infringe copyrighted
content clearly is an inducement to infringement, which is a culpable act
of contributory infringement. Both companies distributed their software
with the intent of encouraging their recipients to download copyrighted
content, took active steps to encourage infringement, and sought to
appropriate displaced Napster users following Napster's shut down, 99
all of which indicated an illegal intent behind the public distribution of
the software.
Justice Souter identified the precise query before the Court to be the
tension between two separate values in copyright-that of encouraging
creative pursuits by protecting creative works from being infringed and
promoting innovation in new forms of communication technologies by
limiting the circumstances in which copyright may be infringed.100
Opening up developers of technology to potential copyright
infringement actions would undoubtedly create a chilling effect on
technological growth. 10 1 But, developing technologies, which sole
purpose and intent was not to facilitate illegal downloads of copyrighted
content, will find protection from liability within the safe harbors of the
staple article of commerce exception enunciated in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.102
97. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940-41 (2005).
98. Id. at 932.
99. Id. at 923-25.
100. Id. at 928.
101. Ann Bartow, Arresting Technology: An Essay, 1 BUFF. INTELL. L.J. 95, 100 (2001).
102. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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While the Grokster decision may be correct on its specific fact
pattern, there is an unstated assumption in the Court's decision that user
downloads and sharing of copyrighted material are illegal acts. This
assumption may lead to the erroneous conclusion that legitimate uses of
information and knowledge contained in creative works do not include
the downloading and sharing of information. Encouraging creativity
and promoting innovation are legitimate goals of the copyright system;
but creative and innovative activities depend to a certain degree on
access to literary and artistic works, because social, economic, and
cultural development is dependent on users of creative works having
access to the materials embodied in literature, music, movies and other
forms of creative content. Exchanging and sharing information among
individuals need not necessarily be an infringement of copyright, and
may instead be a valid, legitimate claim to reasonable access to
information. It is important for the law to recognize reasonable access
to information, for that reinforces the legitimate needs of society to have
access to information for the progress of science and the useful arts.
While the Supreme Court reemphasized conventional legal thought on
the importance of balancing private rights and public interests in literary
and artistic works through copyright laws, an express acknowledgment
for legitimate social access to creative works as a resource for progress
in an age when social networks have increased the potential for public
participation in civil discourse, political dialogue, and collaborative
research is highly warranted.
Contemporary criticisms leveled against the grant of property rights
over intellectual works have been based on unreasonable restrictions on
public access to intellectual works. The extension of the copyright term
for an additional twenty years, for example, keeps copyrighted works
from falling into the public domain for another twenty years, and
prevents society from freely using works to which they are rightfully
entitled. 103 Recognizing patent rights over business methods, as another
example, denies society the freedom to use works that are essential,
socially useful information, and knowledge of legitimate ways to
conduct or operate a business, which ought to be free. 104 Critics of
103. The Copyright Term Extension Act expanded the duration of copyright protection from
fifty years to seventy years after the life of the author. Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 11 Stat. 2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)). In Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190-91 (2003), the Supreme Court decided by a majority of 7-2 that the
Act was not unconstitutional.
104. Business method patents were first recognized in State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) and affirmed in AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court recently decided that
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intellectual property rights argue that expanded copyright protection and
patent rights will cripple society's ability to critically exchange ideas
over an independent network, such as the Internet, which promotes the
free and unrestrained exchange of information and knowledge over an
open and commonly held cyberspace.105  A healthy public domain
comprising information, knowledge, and intellectual works commonly
held by society and easily available for use in innovation and creativity
is essential for social, cultural, and technological development. 106
The critical commentary against expanding intellectual property
rights tells of a deeper legal conundrum in addressing the question of
rights and access to information. Legal systems that are essentially
utilitarian in nature willingly bear various social costs to maximize
overall utility.10 7 In the copyright system, the social cost borne to
achieve the greatest utility of progress of science and arts are exclusive
rights in literary and artistic works. The central difficulty in the rights-
access debate is the impossibility of calibrating the proper extent of
private rights necessary to encourage private individuals to dedicate
innovative and creative energies towards creating intellectual assets for
society.108 Recognizing private rights as a means of achieving general
social utility, where creative works are made fully available to members
of society willing to pay the price for access (which is generally greater
than the marginal cost of producing the intellectual asset), would mean
that a balance between private rights and social utility must be reached.
The ensuing dilemma from the law's attempt to ensure the creation of
intellectual works for the public, while at the same time secure
sufficient public access to these works to encourage innovation and
authorship, is a result of the tension between the right to exclude
a process need not be tied to a machine or transform an article into something else. See Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3255 (2010) ("The primary concern is that patents on busness methods
may prohibit a wide swath of legitimate competition and innovation.").
105. Lawrence Lessig, The Death of Cyberspace, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337, 345-47
(2000).
106. See Boyle, supra note 14 (arguing for an active construction of the public domain to
avoid the "propertization" of informational resources); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965, 1023 (1990) (emphasizing the need to ensure that a robust public domain,
containing the resources for creativity, exists).
107. Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 495, 508 (1986)
("Various versions of utilitarianism evaluate actions by the consequences of those actions to
maximize happiness, the net of pleasure over pain, or the satisfaction of desires.").
108. William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An
Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 359, 385 (1999) ("[C]alibrating the
exact level of incentive protection required to bring collections of information to the market is an
impossible task, one which, even theoretically, has proved vexing.").
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unauthorized use of property and the expectation of reasonable access to
creative works as building blocks for future innovation and creativity.
Arguably, the reason the law struggles with the question of rights and
access is because we, as legal scholars, look for answers to the problem
in the wrong places. We have tried to calibrate the optimum level of
rights by relying on economics to provide answers to a legal problem.
We have also framed the rights-access question as a matter of political
clout, where the most politically influential party to the copyright
bargain gets what it wants, 109 and to which social activism is the best
response.1 10 The utilitarian views statutory rights as a temporary price
paid by society to achieve the long-term benefits of having literary and
artistic works available in the public domain. Sir Thomas Babington
Macaulay's Parliamentary Speech in 1841 exemplifies the utilitarian
view that exclusive rights in creative works are a necessary evil that
must be endured for the long term benefits of having creative works for
public use. He said:
The principle of copyright is this. It is a tax on readers for the purpose
of giving a bounty to writers. The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a
tax on one of the most salutary of human pleasures; and never let us
forget, that a tax on innocent pleasures is a premium on vicious
pleasures. I admit, however, the necessity of giving a bounty to genius
and learning. To give such a bounty, I willingly submit even to this
severe and burdensome tax. Nay, I am ready to increase the tax, if it
can be shown that by so doing I should proportionally increase the
bounty ... .11
But, as technological development creates new markets and copyright
owners seek to expand rights, striking a perfect balance between rights
and access seems impossible. Critical legal scholarship's response to
the problem seeks to garner public support to push back against
expanding rights as a form of social activism against political influence
in copyright laws by large media conglomerates and publishing
houses. 112 This social push back against expanding rights is possible
109. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 122-45 (2001) (arguing that copyright laws are
products of industrial interests represented at the negotiating table when laws are being drafted).
110. Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 375, 387-88 (2005) [hereinafter Elkin-
Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do] ("Creative Commons is a form of political activism and is
best understood as a social movement seeking to bring about social change. It responds to
proposals calling for political activism against the enclosure of intellectual property. Like its
predecessors, the open source movement and free software, it seeks to change the social
consequences of copyright law by instantiating an alternative.").
111. Macaulay, supra note 44, at 311.
112. Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do, supra note 110, at 375-76 ("The legislative
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because the technology has developed to facilitate peer production of
content and collaborative modes of creation through social networking
sites.113 The reason access to information has become a central issue in
copyright policy debates is because existing technological platforms
built upon the infrastructure of the Internet facilitate online discussion
and actively gather a citizenry of the information society to uphold
libertarian notions of freedom, autonomy, individual liberty, and human
rights. This form of social activism is a result of influences from the
critical or realist school of thought, which believes in the law's
indeterminacy and advocates for solutions to legal problems through
real-world social responses or activism. 114  The real world social
response to the expansion of rights in literary and artistic works is to
create an awareness of the inequities of lessening access to information
and the impact of greater rights on individual autonomy. But, real
world social responses to the problem do not provide a solution to the
legal question of how the law may achieve a balance between protecting
rights and granting access over informational resources.
C. The Uneasy Path of Rights Expansion
Professor Ralph S. Brown, in a 1985 article, laid down three
underlying principles in the copyright system, which Congress, other
policy makers, or judges may adopt when deciding whether existing
rights under the copyright system ought to be expanded to cover new
process is captured by the content industries . . . . As public choice theorists have shown, small
homogenous groups that have a lot to gain, such as the content industries, have persistently
pressured for even stronger proprietary rights. Courts seem to be shorthanded, failing to set
constitutional limits to extensive intellectual property rights. Finally, international pressure on
national governments makes it difficult to rely on the global arena for remedying the deficiencies
of intellectual property laws at the domestic level. Given this background, private ordering-self-
regulation voluntarily undertaken by private parties-turns out to be an attractive option. It
promises to allow individuals and communities to figure out, on their own, a way to bypass the
increasingly protectionist global intellectual property regime.").
113. Id. at 396 ("Technology ... is utilized to enable new social practices related to creative
works. These new practices would ultimately change how we understand the creative process and
reconstruct social relations related to creative works. By using new technologies, Creative
Commons' strategy expands the horizon of potential measures for provoking a change. It reflects
the view that legal rules do not dominate behavior, but rather constitute one factor in a complex
matrix of human activity.").
114. See Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REv. 697, 698-99
(1930) (criticizing the realist's rejection of former conceptions of legal understanding-
actualities, rationalists, and positivists). Pound specifically criticized the realist's view that
"[r]eason is an illusion. Experience is not the unfolding of an idea. No 'pure fact of law' is to be
found in rules since the existence of rules of law, as anything outside of the books is an illusion."
Id. at 699.
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forms of creative works.115 The first is a "morally principled approach
[which] exalts authors . . . [as] the bearers and creators of our culture,
both high and popular."116 Professor Brown calls this principle the
"exaltation of authorship,"1 17 which glorifies the author as the
autonomous individual producing works of authorial or artistic genius
for society.118 Second, Professor Brown lays down a constitutional
principle, which emphasizes that Congressional powers under the
intellectual property clause were intended to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts; and were not intended, as Professor Brown
states, "to maximize the returns to authors and inventors."1 19 The rights
of the author, therefore, are subservient to the public interest under the
second principle. This requires Congress, in legislating, and judges, in
deciding cases, to balance the public interest against the private rewards
the law provides authors. The third principle identified by Professor
Brown is based on the economics of the market place for the inherently
public good nature of creative works. 120 As literary and artistic works,
by their nature, cannot be depleted or extinguished by public uses, and
are incapable of any form of exclusive control, which would allow
authors to prevent non-paying members of the public from copying and
distributing the work, the state must intervene and pass copyright laws
to ensure that authors and creators are able to legally exclude others
from copying or using the work without their permission. 121
While these principles provide useful guidance when rights in literary
and artistic works may be justifiably expanded, they do not provide a
workable solution to the question of rights and access over
informational resources in literary and artistic works. In the commercial
market for literary and artistic works, the "exaltation of authorship"
principle has less value in assisting Congress, and judges decide the
extent of private rights premised solely on rewarding the creative genius
of an author or artist. Under the Copyright Act, artistic worth in literary
and artistic works is not a basis for granting rights. Utilitarian works,
which perform purely instructional functions, such as computer
115. Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards,
70 MINN. L. REv. 579, 589-600 (1985).
116. Id.at589.
117. Id.
118. Under this principle, authors are regarded as the "creator and bearer of our culture, both
high and low" and ought to be rewarded for their creations. See id.
119. Id. at 592.
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programs, are regarded as literary works under § 101,122 and the
Supreme Court has, on separate occasions, held that: pictorial
illustrations functioning as an advertisement are pictures subject to
copyright protection; 123  an original selection, coordination, and
arrangement of facts may merit copyright protection over the way those
facts are presented;124 and that a commercial design with an aesthetic
value and utilitarian function, such as a statue used for a table lamp
base, is eligible for copyright protection as a work of art. 125 Works of
creative authorship may also be commissioned today under the "work-
for-hire" doctrine, 126 making authorship an endeavor that is essentially
commercial or market-driven, and less an expression of creative talents
or artistic genius. As such, the first principle of exalted authorship will
offer very little help on how private rights fare against the public
interest. Compared to the exalted authorship principle, the second
principle, based on the utilitarian model for rights, emphasizes progress
as the ultimate goal for which rights serve. The third principle, which
recognizes rights as serving an incentive function for the provision of
public goods, relies on economics to justify the grant and expansion of
rights. All of these principles are grounded in policy-oriented realism
and highlight the need to recognize private rights in order to encourage
the creation of information for society's benefit. However, the latter
two principles do not offer any normative guidance as to how the law in
this area may be developed to ensure that rights serve the purposes of
production and dissemination while allowing for public accessibility to
information for the progress of science and the useful arts.
Rights expansion treads such an uneasy path because the exact extent
of the statutory entitlement granted to copyright owners remains
unresolved and answers to the question of rights and access remain
forthcoming. The question of rights and access cannot be resolved by
economic analysis nor social or political activism because the question
of what the statutory rights entail is essentially a legal one. If statutory
rights are property rights in the conventional sense that a right to
122. Object codes containing instructions to a computer in binary code (e.g., "01101001,"
instructing a computer to add two numbers and save the results) are literary works under
copyright laws. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248-49
(1983) ("[T]he definition of 'computer program' adopted by Congress in the 1980 amendments is
'sets of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result."').
123. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
124. Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348, 361-64 (1991).
125. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213-14 (1954).
126. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 747-48, 752-53 (1989).
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exclude attaches, then the question of access to information becomes a
real concern, because the copyright owner is legally entitled to exclude
society from using the information as the owner of informational
resources. However, if the rights under the copyright statute are a lesser
right than a property right of the in rem kind, and the copyright owner
does not have a general right to exclude society from using the
information, then the question of access is more readily resolvable
because use of informational resources by both the copyright owner and
society becomes an issue of resource management. If rights under the
copyright statute are considered economic privileges that serve a
production function and are intended to encourage use of information in
ways that would promote progress, then the copyright owner has no real
right to exclude society from having access to information that is
grounded in ownership of the work as property. Because the Copyright
Act was passed to encourage production of literary and artistic works by
reward, the rights under the Copyright Act should only provide a
personal right to recover payment for uses of the work. The statutory
right provided under § 106 of the copyright statute is, arguably, an
economic entitlement that is separate from the larger property right of
the author. As statutory rights are economic privileges and protect a
right to receive payment for use of a work, they should not be construed
to entail a possessory right to exclude society from using informational
resources.
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EcONOMIC PRIVILEGES
The distinction between a right that attaches to a thing and a personal
right possessed by an individual suggests that rights in literary and
artistic works may comprise a right to exclude use of creative
expression and specifically enumerated rights to use literary and artistic
works in ways Congress deems to be rewards for creative production.
An owner of property has rights over that which he owns in rem,
meaning that a property owner has an interest in the property or thing,
which is good against the rest of the world. 127 Interests in personam, on
127. For an elaborate treatment of the legal interaction between rights in rem and in personam,
see WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING 68-114 (1919). Hohfeld identifies four types of in rem/in personam
classifications. First is the fundamental classification of primary rights into in rem and in
personam rights; second, classification of judicial proceedings into in rem and in personam; third,
judgments or decrees in rem or in personam; and fourth, enforcements in rem or in personam. Id.
at 69. For the purposes of analysis in this Article, the use of the phrases "in rem" and "in
personam" is specifically applied to the discussion on primary rights belonging to the author and
copyright owner.
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the other hand, are personal interests individuals possess that arise by
virtue of a relationship with the property owner and which are personal
to a person. They neither pertain to, nor convey, property ownership in
a thing.128 An owner of real property, for example, has rights in rem
over the land he owns and is entitled to enforce a right to exclude all
others from trespassing over his land. The rest of the world owes a
specific duty to respect this right of the property owner to exclude
others from encroaching upon the land. 129 The right the property owner
exercises stems from ownership of the land and is metaphorically
attached, or tied, to the land. 130 A lien over land as a security for the
payment of a debt may provide a creditor with a temporary security
interest over a property as an interest in rem, but creates an in personam
right because the right arises by a personal interest that the creditor has
to have the debt repaid by the borrower. 13 1 The lien holder's right is
therefore a personal right, or a right in personam, which may be traced
back to the creditor-debtor relationship existing between the lien holder
and the property owner. 132
This distinction between rights in rem and rights in personam offers
insight into the private right-public domain discussion in copyright
jurisprudence by distinguishing a right to exclude society from using the
work and a right to recover payment from society for using the work.
An author, by virtue of the property right in literary and artistic works,
has a right in rem that is good against the rest of the world. The
author's right in rem implies an ability to control social uses of the work
because of the author's literary property. But, besides a property right
in a work arising by virtue of an author's act of creation, which
arguably entitles authors to exclude society from using the work to
conserve creative integrity or preserve the authenticity of a work so that
works be used only for the purposes of progress, the law also recognizes
certain rights in authors to restrict the rest of the world from
reproducing, distributing, making derivative works, and publicly
performing and digitally transmitting the work through the Copyright
Act.1 33 Recognizing entitlements in literary and artistic works, while
attached to the works as a right in rem, actually stems from a personal
128. Id. at 72.
129. Id.
130. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160-61 (Wis. 1997).
131. Merrill & Smith, supra note 62, at 850 ("Security interests arise with an in personam
agreement between a debtor and a creditor to make a transfer of the full bundle of in rem rights to
the creditor upon the happening of a future contingent event, nonpayment of the debt.").
132. Id.
133. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2005).
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contractual relationship, or an interest in personam between the
copyright owner and the rest of society as represented by Congress to
recover profits from market commercialization of the work as a reward
for creative production. Protecting economic interests to encourage the
reproduction and wide dissemination of the work to the public in order
to fulfill the constitutional intent of promoting the progress of science
and the useful arts, 134 arguably, should not entail an absolute right to
exclude society from using the work. All the right entails is a right to
recover payment for the use of the work. The quid pro quo between
copyright owners and society are temporary rights as rewards for
making creative works fully available for public use through market
mechanisms so that society will have works to facilitate learning.
Rights in personam, which copyright holders have by virtue of the
copyright statute, are generally not an entitlement that an owner of real
or other forms of personal property has by virtue of their ownership of
land or a thing-they are contractual rights that are generally regarded
to be in personam in nature. 135 This right in personam is particularly
pertinent to literary and artistic works because of the peculiar
constitutional recognition of literary and artistic property as a right
given to encourage innovation and creativity to further the interests of
the general public and that of society, and not as a right in itself
pertaining to basic notions of human freedom, liberty, equality, and
democracy underpinning the 5th and 14th Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution. The copyright owner's right under the Copyright Act is
therefore, arguably, a personal right which may be traced back to a
constitutional agreement between the producer of literary and artistic
work and the society in which he lives. 136
These two distinct rights in literary and artistic works ensure that
authors engage in creative production of literary and artistic works for
society's benefit and the dissemination of these works to the public.
While the right in rem generates authorial creativity and production of
original works of authorship, the right in personam encourages the
dissemination of these works to the public. The property right of an
author in the work is a sovereign right of a property owner over the
work, subject to a few legal and moral limitations (such as when a work
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
135. Arthur L. Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 YALE L.J. 501, 509 (1924) ("'Property' rights
are among the rights said to be 'in rem'; contract rights among those 'in personam.').
136. See Alina Ng, The Social Contract and Authorship Allocating Entitlements in the
Copyright System, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 413, 423 (2009) (discussing
the importance of a legal system that protects the development of creative works from outside
influence, thus allowing society to benefit from those works).
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is used for bona fide research purposes or used in a way that advances
the general well-being of society), is an absolute right, good against the
world, that allows an author to deny access to the work based on an
absolute right to exclude. A property owner is under no obligation to
grant another person access to the property, even for monetary
exchange.137 An economic right, however, does not carry with it the
right to exclude in the same way a property right does, but rather takes
the form of a contractual relationship between the author and society to
make the work available or accessible for market value. 138 A copyright
owner, unlike an owner of real or personal property, is under an
obligation to allow access to use creative works for progress under a
social agreement as long as uses of the work are paid for-the whole
point of the statutory rights is to ultimately encourage creative
production of a public good for social utility. An encroachment of the
author's economic right (i.e., the right to commercial profits from the
dissemination and sale of a work) does not therefore invoke an absolute
right to exclude use of the work based on a property right, or a right in
rem, against the use of the work by an injunction, but rather suggests a
form of contractual breach, which remedies, if any, have to be sought in
an action in personam against the person who has conducted an act to
adversely affect the author's economic right. An author pursuing his or
her economic interest by making a work commercially available on the
market implicitly agrees to grant the public access to and reasonable
uses of the work, and should, as a matter of law, not be entitled to later
claim a superior right in rem over the work-unless the integrity of its
contents is affected. The expression of in rem and in personam interests
in creative works, therefore, provides some normative legal guidance
that balances property rights of authors and economic privileges of
copyright owners against the legitimate needs of society to have access,
and offers an interpretation of property rights in literary and artistic
works that is grounded in legal doctrine and a theory of property rights.
As this distinction between a property right and an economic
privilege does not appear as a matter of doctrine in copyright
jurisprudence, there is little normative guidance to provide answers to
the question of how authors, copyright owners, and users of literary and
artistic works should behave in the legal system. Statutory rights that
recognize specific rights to use literary and artistic works are called
137. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 154 (Wis. 1997).
138. Kathleen K. Olson, Preserving the Copyright Balance: Statutory and Constitutional
Preemption of Contract-Based Claims, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 83, 87 (2006) (describing licensing
agreements to give effect to a user's purchase of access and use rights rather than a purchase of
the copyrighted work itself).
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property rights, and this label gives rise to the assumption that these
exclusive rights are in rem property rights that allow the copyright
owner to generally exclude society from using literary and artistic
works as a thing subject to a right to exclude. This assumption has a
significant impact on the rights-access question because use rights, such
as the right to print or create derivative works, recognizes competing
uses of literary and artistic works for the purposes of progress through
fair use principles and the idea/expression dichotomy.139  The
congressional grant of a right to print implicitly assumes that society
will be able to use the work as long as the use does not unreasonably
interfere with the copyright owner's right to receive payment for the
production and dissemination of the work to society.140 The exclusive
right to print only serves the purpose of artificially creating boundaries
in order to provide copyright owners with institutional support to
produce and disseminate a good that is non-rival and non-excludable. 14 1
The positive right to print or reproduce literary and artistic works is,
therefore, an in personam right, which the copyright owner has that does
not create in rem rights to possess the work as property.
The claim that the statutory rights under § 106 of the Copyright Act
are economic privileges and not property rights belonging to the author
finds support in historical documentation of early copyright law, in the
theory of economics on information cost, and in established legal
principles that separate ideas from expression. Historical evidence
seems to suggest that authors have always had a separate right in the
work that was distinct from the publisher's right to print the manuscript.
Economic theory also shows that there is a distinction between property
rights and economic privileges in copyright law, as information cost
theory explains differing consumer behavior in the use and consumption
of literary and artistic works-consumers appear willing to expand
greater information costs for the expressive component of creative
works (that the law protects as with an in rem right) while they are less
139. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2005) (statutory codification of the fair use principles); Baker
v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1879) (laying down the principle that expressions are protected
and ideas are not).
140. Coase stated that public goods, such as light from a lighthouse, may be provided
privately; thus, the role of government was
limited to the establishment and enforcement of property rights in the lighthouse ....
The problem of enforcement was no different for them than for other suppliers of
goods and services to the shipowner. The property rights were unusual only in that they
stipulated the price that could be charged.
Coase, The Lighthouse, supra note 9, at 375.
141. In the same way, the Crown supported the building of lighthouses by granting rights to
private enterprises to build lighthouses and levying tolls against shipowners. Id. at 364.
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willing to incur the same costs for works that are more generic (that
should be protected by an in personam right). The distinction between
property rights and economic privileges is also observable as a matter of
legal principle in copyright law from the distinction the law draws
between protectable expressions and non-protectable ideas.
A. As a Matter of History
Early publishing contracts in England show that authors retained
what appears to be literary property after assigning the right to print to
the printer. A publishing contract would include a clause requiring the
author to refrain from selling the manuscript to another without the
consent of the publisher and from interfering with the publication of the
work once the manuscript was sold. The 1667 publication contract for
Paradise Lost, for example, contained a clause requiring John Milton to
refrain from publishing or printing the work. The inclusion of such a
clause was, as Professor Lyman Patterson pointed out, unnecessary
unless the publisher recognized a residual right that the author had in
the manuscript which would allow him to interfere with the publication
of the work. 142 This residual right indicated that the conveyance of the
right to print the manuscript was not a complete conveyance of the
author's rights but a mere assignment of a specific right to use the
manuscript in a particular way (i.e., to print and publish the work). It
would appear that the author still retained an absolute property right in
the work over the more limited copyright that the publisher owned
following an assignment. The way early publishing contracts were
drafted provides an important piece of evidence which demonstrates
that a property right in the manuscript belonging to the author and a
more specific and limited right to use the work in a particular way (to
print the manuscript) were two separate and distinct legal rights. The
retention of a property right in the work would suggest that the
publishing contract between the author and his publisher conveyed a
mere right to use the work and not a complete sale of the work as a
thing. Professor Patterson views an author's conveyance of a copyright
as a negative covenant to refrain from exercising the full extent of his
rights once the copyright has been sold. The publishing contract is not a
sale of the entire work as a "thing" that was subject to a property right.
As Professor Patterson explains:
[I]t points up the value of analyzing the author's conveyance in terms
of a negative covenant rather than the sale of his work. The distinction
is more than one of semantics, and it is helpful because we have here a
142. LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 74 (1968).
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unique example of a chattel being conveyed not for its intrinsic value,
but to enable the purchaser to exercise the right which is actually
being conveyed. The manuscript is more than a symbol, of which a
stock certificate is an example, but less than the object of purchase, of
which a book itself is an example. 143
The fact that early publishing contracts were not absolute transfers of
ownership in the work, but rather assignments of a specific right to print
and publish more similar to a personal license than an outright
conveyance of property, supports the claim that the right to print a work
is a mere economic privilege and not a property right. Even before the
first legislation to expressly grant rights to print and publish books (the
Statute of Anne was passed to establish rights in literary and artistic
works as a statutory right in 1710), the author's rights and the
publisher's rights as two separate and distinct rights seem to have been
evident. But this distinction may have been lost in the trilogy of court
cases interpreting the Statute of Anne and the U.S. Copyright Act of
1790. In 1769, the U.K.'s Queen's Bench Division, in Millar v.
Taylor,144 decided that the author had a perpetual property right in the
work that was separate from the statutory right to print manuscripts for
fourteen years granted to authors and publishers under the Statute of
Anne. The Court decided that the author's literary property existed at
common law outside the statutory rights provided by the Statute of
Anne and was a separate and distinct legal right that entitled the author,
as the creator and originator of the work, to control how the work was
used and represented to the public once the manuscript was sold to the
publisher.145
The House of Lords, the highest court in the United Kingdom,
overruled the decision of Millar v. Taylor in 1774 in Donaldson v.
143. Id. at 75.
144. [1769] 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 252 (H.L.) ("[lit is agreeable to the principles of right and
wrong, the fitness of things, convenience, and policy, and therefore to the common law, to protect
the copy before publication.").
145. Lord Mansfield, writing his decision for the Court last, traced the source of that common
law to natural law principles, stating that the author's right had to survive the statutory right
otherwise the author
is no more master of the use of his own name. He has no control over the correctness
of his own work. He can not prevent additions. He cannot retract errors. He cannot
amend; or cancel a faulty edition. Any one may print, pirate, and perpetuate the
imperfections to the disgrace and against the will of the author; may propagate
sentiments under his name, which he disapproves, repents and is ashamed of. He can
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Beckett,146 deciding that the only rights in literary and artistic works
were copyrights granted by statute, and that the author's common-law
right in his or her literary creation, if they ever existed, had been
abolished by the Statute of Anne. 147 The decision was intended to deny
British booksellers a claim over books in perpetuity-a claim they
previously had by virtue of the Crown Licensing Acts until they were
repealed and replaced by the Statute of Anne, granting limited
protection 48-by asserting a common law copyright that was acquired
from the author. 149 But the decision itself acknowledged the important
contributions authors make to society through their works of authorship
and hinted at the need for society to access works while encouraging
authors to create. 150 What was objectionable to the Court was the
potential control that publishers could have over literary and artistic
works, and not the notion of a literary property owned by the author of
the work. 15 1
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided the issue of the author's
common law copyright in 1834 in Wheaton v. Peters, the Court decided,
as did the House of Lords in Donaldson v. Beckett,152 that the only
rights in literary and artistic works were statutorily granted, and that
146. [1774] 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.).
147. Id. at 844 ("The Statute of Anne was not declaratory of the common law, but introductive
of a new law, to give learned men a property which they had not before.").
148. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 32-34 (rev. ed., Stan. Univ. Press 2003).
149. Id. at 35.
150. L. RAY PATrERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF
USERS' RIGHTS 41-42 (1991) ("It was not for gain that Bacon, Newton, Milton, Locke, instructed
and delighted the world; it would be unworthy [of] such men to traffic with a dirty bookseller for
so much [as] a sheet of letter press . . . what situation would the public be in with regard to
literature, if there were no means for compelling a second impression of a useful work to be put
forth, or wait till a wife or children are to be provided for by the sale of an edition. All our
learning will be locked upon the hands of the Tonsons and the Lintons of the age, who will set
what price upon it their avarice chuses to demand, till the public become as much their slaves, as
their own hackney compilers are." (quoting Lord Camden, who, in rejecting the author's common
law copyright, hailed the value of good works of authorship while condemning the monopolistic
practices of the booksellers)).
151. Id. at 41 ("The arguments attempted to be maintained on the side of the Respondents,
were found on patents, privileges, Star-chamber decrees, and the bye laws of the Stationers'
Company; all of them the effects of the grossest tyranny and usurpation; the very last places in
which I should have dreamt of finding the least trace of the common law of this kingdom; and
yet, by a variety of subtle reasoning and metaphysical refinements, have they endeavoured to
squeeze out the spirit of the common law from premises, in which it could not possibly have
existence." (quoting Lord Camden, who opposed perpetual copyright as put forward by the
respondent bookseller)).
152. [1774] 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.).
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common law property rights of the author did not exist. 153 Copyright in
U.S. Supreme Court Reports existed by way of statute-not at common
law-and required compliance with statutory formalities before the
right could be enforced. 154 Yet underlying the decision in Wheaton was
neither a question of whether an author had literary rights in the work
nor whether the Copyright Act replaced rights that authors had in their
work, if they did have literary rights at common law. Rather, the
controversy in Wheaton was the conflict between state power to protect
literary and artistic works against federal power to protect works under
statutory copyright law. 155  Wheaton arguably addressed the
constitutional issue between state and federal powers in terms of
protecting literary and artistic works, but a lot remains to be said about
the author's literary property. While the courts rejected the author's
natural rights in their work and decided statutory rights were the only
rights in creative works, the issue of the exact nature of entitlements in
creative works remains unsettled because the author's prepublication
right-the right to make changes, maintain the integrity of the work,
increase creative input-has to be larger than the statutorily granted
rights to print and publish. As evidence exists to suggest that the author
retained rights that were not completely assigned to the publisher when
the manuscript was sold, and as the trilogy of cases on statutory rights
were primarily concerned with the public's ability to access creative
works from the publisher (and not the author), the distinction between
the rights of authors in their work that were both retained and never
assigned and state-granted privileges of publishers to publish works for
the public remains as two distinct legal concepts that were never
specifically adjudicated.
B. As a Theory of Economics
The distinction between property rights and economic privileges is
also a natural legal response to economic theory on information costs.
The economic theory of information costs posits that rational
individuals will search for the best product or service until the marginal
cost of searching for information about products or services on the
153. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 592-93 (1834).
154. Id. at 592 ("Congress, by the act of 1790, instead of sanctioning an existing perpetual
right in an author in his works, created the right secured for a limited time, by the provisions of
that law. The right of an author to a perpetual copyright, does not exist by the common law of
Pennsylvania.").
155. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 148, at 44 ("However much it voiced the English discourse,
Wheaton v. Peters was at bottom a distinctively American decision, representing a victory for
federal power over state power.").
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market exceeds the marginal benefit of the search. 156 At times, users of
literary and artistic works are willing to bear high search costs to find
works whose individual expression will satisfy a specific purpose. A
movie producer, for example, may incur considerable information costs
searching for the perfect piece of music for the film's theme song. An
author may incur high information costs searching for the perfect art
piece to describe in his or her work. Researchers often spend countless
hours searching for the perfect piece of evidence to support their
hypotheses. In these situations, the creator of the new work will often
incur considerable information costs searching for the right work to use
for his or her own creation, and therefore, the value of the work to the
user is incredibly high. Other users of literary and artistic works, such
as a music listener or a moviegoer, may spend less time searching for
the "best" product on the market because substitutes are readily
available. A person may decide not to watch a particular movie or
listen to a particular song if a substitutable product is available. The
information costs a user is willing to incur depend on whether the work
is used for its expressive component and whether the user is a creator of
a new work or a consumer of content. A work is generally not
substitutable when it is used for its specific expressive content.
The fact that creative works are substitutable for some users and not
for others demonstrates that there is a discernible difference between the
value users place on works depending on their intended use. Non-
substitutable works have a higher user value and, therefore, rights
should protect more than just the economic value of the work: they
should protect the author's creative personality and authorial integrity
against uses of the work in ways that may, without legitimate reason
(such as pursuing research for progress), undermine the author's
integrity and deter the creation of new works. In such cases, a property
right allowing the author to exclude society would be justified because a
property right in the work as a creative expression of authorship protects
the work as a thing and protects the author and his or her authentic
expression. The value of such protection is in the freedom a right to
exclude gives authors, allowing them to continually create.
156. George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcON. 213, 214 (1961)
(discussing the consumer's search for a commodity with the best market price considering the
differences in the terms of sale, for example, performance of more services or larger range of
varieties in stock); id. ("Any buyer seeking the commodity would pay whatever price is asked by
the seller whom he happened to canvass, if he were content to buy from the first seller. But, if the
dispersion of price quotations of sellers is at all large (relative to the cost of search), it will pay,
on average, to canvass several sellers.").
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On the other hand, the value users place on substitutable works is
largely an economic value that does not correlate with the expressive
content of the work. A work that is only passively consumed by society
need only be protected by an economic privilege that entitles the right-
holder to receive payment for the work. An absolute right to exclude
society cannot be justified when the value users place on a work is
purely economic and not expressive. The statutory rights under § 106
of the Copyright Act would protect the right of the copyright owner to
receive payment for uses of works that are consumptive in nature-as
long as the user uses the work in the ways laid out in § 106, the
copyright owner is entitled to receive payment-and should not be
applied as a general exclusionary right of ownership in the work against
society as a whole. In this situation, economic privileges protecting the
right to use the work in a particular way assure the copyright owner of
payment for these uses. The right to exclude society from using a
substitutable work is not necessary or desirable when a user is not
willing to incur tremendous information search costs because the user is
likely using the work as a consumer of goods, and must only pay for his
use.157 Only when a work is used specifically for its expressive content
would the exercise of a right to exclude be justifiable to protect the
integrity of a work of authorship.158  Economic privileges protect
commercial interests in recovering payment, while exclusionary rights
ensure that an author's personal interest in undertaking the production
of a creative work is protected in a situation where the author's integrity
and creative personality may be threatened by the use of his or her
expression.159
A user who uses the work as a creator for its expressive content, and
a consumer who uses a work for its commercial content, use different
aspects of a work and are willing to expend considerably varying
information search costs. Because these aspects are valued differently,
this indicates that there are distinguishable components to a work and
the distinction between property rights and economic privileges
becomes more pronounced from a behavioral economics perspective.
Thus, the legal system's response to the question of rights and access by
157. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 402
(2003).
158. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1, 53 (2001) (analyzing the Court's reasoning in Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
159. See Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 113-14 (1997) (discussing
the use of copyright divisibility to protect an author from misuse of the work).
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separating in rem and in personam rights is apt. The creator uses
portions of a work that, at common law, were thought of as being the
literary property of an author because of the very act of creation and
authorship.160 In searching for, and using, another author's specific
form of expression, the second author is not using the work for the
information it contains as a resource but rather for the first author's
creativity and authentic expression protectable as an in rem right, which
evokes a right to exclude. 161 Conversely, when a consumer uses a work
as a resource, whether for entertainment or education purposes, he or
she is not as concerned about the expressive content of the work as
much as the information it conveys. There is no necessity for the law to
protect a work with a property right to exclude use when the use of the
work does not affect the personality of the creator contained in the work
and involves uses that compete with other use rights that are granted
specifically under the Copyright Act. Here, the primary concern of a
copyright owner is not the protection of a work's integrity, but rather
the payment of fees for the use of a work, for which there is no need for
an exclusionary control over the work-a personal right to compel the
consumer to pay for using the work will suffice. Information cost
theory posits that a consumer would willingly incur search costs to find
goods they desire when the benefit of the search outweighs its cost. The
theory indicates that the more costly the search, the more likely a
portion of a work would be protected by an exclusionary property right
rather than a personal privilege for the recovery of investment in
production and dissemination of a work.
C. As a Principle of Law
The third observable distinction between property rights and
economic privileges in copyright is a subtle distinction in how the
common law protects the core expression of works from being taken
and used and the management or governancel 62 of various rights to use
works through statute. Common law protection of core creative
expressions can be observed in how the law makes ideas and facts
160. Millar v. Taylor, [1769] 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 253 (H.L.) ("If the copy belongs to an author,
after publication; it certainly belonged to him, before.").
161. See Smith, supra note 16, at 1807-08 ("Historically, in English Law, a statutory limited-
term exclusive right over publishing and selling competed with a more robust common law right
that gave property in the work itself. In our terms, common law copyright is more based on the
exclusion strategy.").
162. See generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion vs. Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002) (discussing the exclusion and governance
theories of property rights in flushing out how such rights are defined and enforced).
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underlying works of authorship free for society1 63 to expand upon1
while ensuring that original expressions are not pirated.165  Judge
Hand's decision in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., for
example, was not based on the economic losses the copyright owner
suffered from a motion picture pirating a play, but on the copying of a
specific series of plots from the play that represented the expression of
authorship.166 And in Nichols v. Universal Picture Corp., Judge Hand
considered the same issue-whether the core expression of a playwright
had been pirated-and came to the conclusion that it was not given the
generality of the theme used in the second work.167 But, in many other
instances, the content of the law does not see to the protection of
expression as "literary property," 168 and instead protects the commercial
potential of the work to encourage its production and dissemination to
society. Protecting rights to distribute,169 perform' 70  and display
publicly,' 7' and public performance by means of digital audio
transmission, 172 ensure the recovery of market profits and minimally
relate to any form of literary property of the author. Compulsory
licensing provisions for nondramatic musical works, 173 noncommercial
163. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879), superseded by statute, Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133-34, as recognized
in Richmond Homes Mgmt., Inc. v. Raintree, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1517, 1524 (W.D. Va. 1994),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 66 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (discussing how an author's property interest in his ideas
extends only so far as their expression, thus not entitling him to prevent all use of his ideas).
164. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Knowledge is
expanded ... by granting new authors of historical works a relatively free hand to build upon the
work of their predecessors.").
165. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1936) ("We have
often decided that a play may be pirated without using the dialogue.").
166. Id. at 55-56 ("The play is the sequence of the confluents of all these means, bound
together in an inseparable unity; it may often be most effectively pirated by leaving out the
speech, for which a substitute can be found, which keeps the whole dramatic meaning. That as it
appears to us is exactly what the defendants have done here; the dramatic significance of the
scenes we have recited is the same, almost to the letter.").
167. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 ("In the two plays at bar we think both as to incident and
character, the defendant took no more-assuming that it took anything at all-than the law
allowed. The stories are quite different.").
168. Id. ("It is of course essential to any protection of literary property, whether at common-
law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would
escape by immaterial violations.").
169. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(3) (West 2005).
170. Id. § 106(4).
171. Id. § 106(5).
172. Id. § 106(6) (only for sound recordings).
173. Id. § 115 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
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broadcasting, 174 secondary transmissions by cable systems, 175 and the
public performance of a sound recording by means of a subscription
digital audio transmission1 76 also ensure transfer of the work to society
in return for paying a fee for using the work that indicates an in
personam right to receive payment for use of the work rather than an in
rem right in the work itself.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act also manages the various uses
of informational resources to ensure that the copyright owner recovers
payment for use of their work by making it an offense to circumvent
technological measures that effectively control access to a work. 177 The
Act controls the use of informational resources for which a copyright
owner may claim payment by setting up "fences" to exclude non-paying
members of society. 17 8 Arguably, a user who willingly pays should be
allowed to use the protected information, unless the author's creative
expression is used in a way that undermines the integrity of the work
and detracts from scientific and artistic progress. This subtle legal
distinction between the rights of the author and the privileges of the
copyright owner may explain why society regards student plagiarism to
be wrong even when no commercial harm is done to the copyright
owner: because what has been taken is the original author's tangible
personality, or literary property, as expressed in a work and represented
as one's own. This distinction also explains why the law requires a
copy of a work to be substantially similar to the original to find a
copyright infringement: because appropriating the essence of another's
original expression represents taking a core protectable interest in the
work itself.179 The separation of the author's right and the copyright
owner's privilege also explains why the law protects the author of a
commissioned work as a joint-author with an equal and undivided
interest in the work, even when the work is clearly intended to belong to
the commissioner of the work.s 0
174. Id. § 118.
175. Id. § 111(c).
176. Id. § 114(d)(2).
177. Id. § 1201.
178. Smith, supra note 16, at 1809 ("[T]he Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of
1988 prohibits an activity-namely, circumventing 'a technological measure that controls access
to a [copyrighted] work."').
179. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1936)
(discussing how the "dramatic significance" of the work was infringed upon).
180. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
aff'd, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) ("Joint authors co-owning copyright in a work 'are deemed to be
tenants in common,' with 'each having an independent right to use or license the copyright,
subject only to a duty to account to the other co-owner for any profits earned thereby."').
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IV. RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES IN INFORMATION: WHAT THIS MEANS
The claim that there are separate property rights and economic
incentives in literary and artistic works has significant meaning for
copyright law. Real property and intellectual property include the same
right to exclude the rest of the world from using property as a resource.
For literary and artistic works, the right to exclude others from using a
work is treated as the "property" right of the copyright owner. 181
The significant differences in physical nature between real and
intellectual property, coupled with the constitutional goal of granting
intellectual property rights in the first place, renders a possessory right
to exclude informational resources from society through copyright laws
unfit for an institution designed to promote progress of science and the
useful arts. The administrative costs of protecting copyright are also
significantly higher for real property given the intangibility of literary
and artistic works. 182  For real property, there will always be an
identifiable number of infringers on the possessory right of exclusion,
and it is generally easier to numerically identify the times when the
right to exclude is affected. For literary and artistic works, which are
generally non-excludable and non-rival, protecting exclusion rights may
be impossible because the copyright owner cannot always trace
infringement. The public nature of literary and artistic works make the
right to exclude a difficult, if not impossible, right to protect, even
where the copyright owner is entitled to the right. A copyright owner
may be able to prevent the reading of a physical copy of the work or
refuse to permit the reading of a copy of a manuscript or the listening to
a musical composition while the work is in his or her sole possession.
However, as soon as the work is disseminated, the right to exclude
becomes obsolete because it is virtually impossible to prevent access to
the story line in the novel or sheet notes of a musical composition.
Once a literary and artistic work has been put on the market, the right to
exclude loses its meaning; even if technology was employed to exclude
others from reading the novel or listening to the composition, the
essence of a work is never completely protected by the right to exclude.
The difficulty of enforcing a right is not a reason to not protect it. But,
181. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyle, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (noting a copyright owner's "right to
exclude others from using his property").
182. William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic
Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 7 (2000) ("The second major cost of a copyright system are
administrative and enforcement costs. These include the costs of setting up boundaries or erecting
imaginary fences that separate protected and unprotected elements of a work. They also include
the costs of excluding trespassers, and apprehending and sanctioning violators. These costs tend
to be greater for intangible than tangible property.").
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when a right belongs solely to the author, and not the copyright owner,
refusal to enforce an exclusionary entitlement is well-justified, because
the essence of what is protected is not an entitlement or interest in
recovering payment for the use of a work, but rather a tangible and
well-defined "thing": the author's creative personality and authorial
integrity.
Another significant difference between real property and literary and
artistic works is that there may be a different level of personal
connection between a creator and his or her literary and artistic work
versus an owner of real property. Land, a finite resource, may have
special meaning to its owner. A landowner who inherited land and
lived and raised a family on it may have sentimental value in the land
that would not be represented in the market price. 183 In fact, the market
may severely undercut the landowner's accumulated value in a piece of
land, considering an owner's non-economic value. 184 Many landowners
refuse to sell land where they have substantial emotional investment. 185
In the same way, an author of literary and artistic works may have a
personal and sentimental connection to the product of his personality,
and may be reluctant to see the public use the work in a way contrary to
his original intent or personality. Authors often consider their work the
"precious life-blood of a master spirit, embalmed and treasured up on
purpose to a life beyond life,"1 86 and a book has often been likened to a
183. See Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 33 (Conn. 1980) (noting that the courts have been
unwilling to sell co-owned land to achieve a partition if one co-owner has been "in actual and
exclusive possession of a portion of the property for a substantial period of time[,] . .. has made
her home on the property; and ... derive[d] her livelihood from the operation of a business on ...
the property, as her family before her has for many years").
184. Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) ("'[J]ust
compensation' has been held to be satisfied by payment of market value . . .. Compensation in
the constitutional sense is therefore not full compensation, for market value is not the value that
every owner of property attaches to his property but merely the value that the marginal owner
attaches to his property. Many owners are 'intramarginal,' meaning that because of relocation
costs, sentimental attachments, or the special suitability of the property for their particular
(perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value their property at more than its market value (i.e., it is not
'for sale'). Such owners are hurt when the government takes their property and gives them just its
market value in return. The taking in effect confiscates the additional (call it 'personal') value that
they obtain from the property, but this limited confiscation is permitted provided the taking is for
a public use.").
185. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005) (involving landowners
in an eminent domain action who had lived on the land at issue for over sixty years). But see MO.
ANN. STAT. §§ 523.253, 523.256 (West 2006); Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of Kansas City v.
Ivanhoe Neighborhood Council, No. WD 70655, 2010 WL 1656817, at *8 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 27,
2010) (emphasizing the need for good faith negotiations in an eminent domain action to ensure
proper compensation).
186. JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 339, 342 (Gordon
Teskey ed., W. W. Norton & Co. 2005) (1667).
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progeny of its author.187  But the connection between authors and their
work is, arguably, stronger than the lifelong landowner, because a
literary work is produced by creative labor and represents the author's
creative personality. In this sense, property rights, similar in effect to
the moral rights of authors in continental Europe, offer the author
assurance that the public will not use the work in a way that adversely
affects the author's artistic creativity and authentic personality., 88
Rather, they create an added responsibility on society to use works in
ways that contribute towards, or at minimum do not harm, the progress
of science and the useful arts. 189
This part of the Article explains the legal consequences of making a
distinction between property rights and economic incentives upon the
institution of copyright law. First, from the publisher's view, the rights
under the Copyright Act serve only as an incentive to produce and
disseminate information and provide an exclusive right that assures
publishers that the investments made in producing and distributing the
work to society will be recoverable through the market. Publishers do
not have rights in the work and are not entitled to exercise a general
right to exclude society from using it. The copyright owner's limited
right to exclude others from using the work serves only to enforce a
contractual right to recover payment from society. Second, the public is
entitled to use information contained in literary and artistic works for
purposes the copyright system seeks to further, such as progress in
science and useful arts, unless the use of the work is an unreasonable
interference with the copyright owner's ability to receive payment, or if
the use adversely affects the author's creative personality and authorial
integrity. Society's ability to use literary and artistic works consistently
187. ROSE, supra note 92, at 38.
188. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, "Author-Stories:" Narrative's Implications for Moral Rights
and Copyright's Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 24 (2001) ("The essence of a
moral rights injury lies in its assault upon the author's personality, as that personality is embodied
in the fruits of her creation. In other words, because an author's works 'continue to embody the
author's personality, acts done to them that impair their ability accurately to reflect the author's
personality should be actionable."' (quoting Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A
Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 4
(1988))).
189. For a discussion on the relational aspect of property generally, see generally Gregory S.
Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745
(2009). Alexander contends that introducing property rights of authors to control use of their
work brings into the copyright system a normative standard for conduct in relation to the
production and use of creative works based on the relational aspects of property rights that goes
beyond protecting the author as an individual creator towards the imposition of a moral
responsibility to produce and disseminate works that will promote progress of science and arts.
Id.
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with the constitutional intent for progress of science and arts will be
protected against the exercises of a possessory right to exclude that
which denies access and prevents technological development. Third,
the property right of the author is a specific right that protects the
author's autonomy or individuality and entitles the author to exclude
society from using the work when the use adversely affects his or her
creative personality. The protection of the author's personality is
important for encouraging creation of works that benefit society,
because the right protects authorial freedom to create authentic works of
authorship without fear of the author's integrity being undermined or
disparaged.
A. The Incentive to Produce and Disseminate
Separating the author's property right from the copyright owner's
economic privileges allows for a clearer analysis of the incentives
provided for by statute, as well as what these entitlements entail. The
incentive to produce and disseminate creative works takes the form of
exclusive privileges to use information in the ways specified in § 106 of
the Copyright Act. But these rights allow exclusive uses of information,
which does not include a possessory right. While possessory rights-
with a general right to exclude and use rights with specifically
enumerated entitlements-may belong to an owner of property, both are
conceptually and legally distinct concepts that serve different purposes.
Possessory rights in property allow the property owner to conserve and
preserve resources that are scarce and prone to depletion from overuse.
Use rights, on the other hand, aim to put resources to their optimal use,
and thus take the form of governance or management of resources that
are not necessarily extinguishable through overuse. Because literary
and artistic works are not extinguishable in the same way most natural
resources are, the rights serve to govern their uses and ensure that a
resource necessary to fulfill the public's need to progress science and
the useful arts remains available for society's use. 190 It defeats the
law's purpose-encouraging production and dissemination of creative
works-if the rights granted by statute entail possessory rights that
copyright owners may use to exclude society from using works that
have been published and distributed to the public.
190. See Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50
ARIz. L. REv. 445, 458-66 (2008) (discussing how use rights apply more appropriately when a
resource is needed by society for various reasons, such as water, and should be subjected to more
specific governance rules).
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Protecting the copyright owner's interest-as an economic privilege
to use creative works in specifically enumerated ways-fulfills the
law's intent of achieving progress in science and arts through the
creation of literary and artistic works more precisely because society is
able to use works in ways that will advance progress as long as they
fulfill the constitutional bargain and pay for using works produced and
disseminated by the copyright owner. Producing creative works, like
building a lighthouse, involves using scarce resources such as labor,
expenses, and time. Coupled with the fact that literary and artistic
works are non-rival and non-excludable once distributed to the public,
the need to provide incentives to private individuals to undertake
creative production is great. Economic privileges under the Copyright
Act serve to encourage production and dissemination of creative works
by ensuring that creative investments are recoverable from the market
and are balanced against society's interest in using the work. Privileges
to use creative works exclusively provide copyright producers with
legally enforceable rights necessary to collect payment for public uses
of a non-rival and non-excludable good in the same way property rights
allow lighthouse owners to collect levies from ships in their path. These
privileges provide a resource for society and require the copyright
owner to exercise personal contractual-type rights as a provider of
goods against users of their work. Economic privileges do not provide
copyright owners with possessory rights over the work consistent with
ownership of property, and therefore-so long as use of the work is paid
for-do not entail control over how society uses the work.
B. Public Access to Information
The separation of property rights from economic privileges will also
ensure greater public access to information because the general public
will be entitled to use informational resources as long as they pay for
uses that fall within the statutorily enumerated rights of the copyright
owner. The grant of economic privileges rather than possessory rights
of exclusion requires copyright owners to monitor uses of their works
and, where necessary, protect their works through technology requiring
payment before works are released to the public for use.
Conceptualizing the copyright owner's right as a privilege distances the
law from the application of the doctrine of contributory infringement
against burgeoning technology that may increase society's access to and
use of informational resources and puts the burden of monitoring works
for recovering their investment on the copyright owner rather than the
legal system. Furthermore, because economic privileges are not
necessarily connected to the physicality of a "thing" owned, they are
2010] 139
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
malleable to social needs for accessing informational resources for
progress in the science and useful arts. The public cannot be excluded
from using the work just because new markets emerge from new
technologies, and in situations where access is increased by developing
new technologies, economic privileges may be changed to
accommodate changing social culture through a more comprehensive
and flexible system of compulsory licenses. 191 Treating entitlements
granted to copyright owners as privileges rather than rights also
provides the legal system with greater flexibility when balancing the
entitlement to recover investments from the market with the entitlement
to access and use works for progress through fair use principles. While
fair use is an affirmative defense to a copyright infringement suit,192
treating copyright entitlements as privileges granted specifically to
reward creativity for society's benefit will allow the law to regard uses
of works for science, art, research, and education as consistent with the
Constitution's goal-and therefore presumptively fair-shifting the
burden upon the copyright owner to prove that the use was not within
society's entitlement to use the work for advancement. Conceivably,
the only way society's entitlement to advancing science and useful arts
may be properly realized is for the copyright system to treat rights that
were previously considered "property" as specifically enumerated state-
granted privileges to use literary and artistic works instead.
C. The Author's Right to Exclude
The final area of entitlements over literary and artistic works that
have received very little attention-perhaps because of the treatment by
courts and scholars of the common law right in literary and artistic
works-is the author's right in his or her creation. Because the
copyright system does not explicitly protect a specific literary property
as a separate property right belonging exclusively to the author,
recognizing and protecting such a right appears necessary if the
institutional goals of the copyright system are to be achieved. This
Article argued that the law should recognize a separate author's
191. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary & Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as rev.
at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, art. 1lb1 (2), 13
(1986), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs
woOOl.pdf (setting international copyright standards, but providing only for compulsory licenses
under Articles I Ibis(2) (for broadcasts and public communications by wireless means, including
when the communication is made by another organization for rebroadcasting a work) and 13 (for
musical works and the words contained in them)).
192. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2005) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of copyright.").
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property right to protect the creative personality of the author and
provide authors with the freedom to produce authentic works of
authorship without fear that the work may be undermined or disparaged
once published and distributed. Assuming that great authors create
great works for the benefit of society without the lure of commercial
success, as Lord Camden candidly recognized,193 protecting a personal
right for authors will not hamper, but rather will contribute to progress,
because great works of authorship can be produced free from the fear of
what society may do with the work. Property rights in literary and
artistic work entitle the author to exercise a possessory right over the
work and thereby exclude uses that adversely affect his or her creative
personality in ways that are not conducive to promoting progress. This
is arguably the most important right in the copyright system for
facilitating the production of authentic works of authorship that convey
both reliability and integrity in content to further society's progress.
Producing works of authentic authorship will likely evade the copyright
system until and unless authors are encouraged to produce works that
make positive contributions to science and the arts by a legal regime
that recognizes literary property in creative works and protects the core
component of genuine creativity that makes the production of such
works possible.
V. A NORMATIVE PROPOSAL
This Article presents a normative proposal for the treatment of
entitlements of three parties with interests in literary and artistic works
in the copyright system: the author as the creator of the work, the
copyright owner as the investor who makes the work's publication and
distribution possible, and society as users of the work. By treating
statutory rights and property rights as two legally separate and
conceptually distinct entitlements, the law will be in a better position to
determine how these different interests in literary and artistic works
may be protected. The economic privilege to use works in a particular
way rewards investments in the production and distribution of works to
society. They recognize that copyright owners must have a mechanism
to recover their investment in making the work available to society
while ensuring that these mechanisms remain malleable to society's
need to have access to the work. The essential goal of the Copyright
193. Millar v. Taylor, [1769] 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 223 (H.L.) ("Now, without publication, 'tis
useless to the owner; because without profit: and property, without the power of use and disposal,
is an empty sound. In that state, 'tis lost to the society, in point of improvement; as well as to the
author, in point of interest.").
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Act is to create exclusive rights that enable copyright owners to recover
payment for uses of their works, which once published and
disseminated, are non-rival and non-excludable. Economic privileges
under the Copyright Act fulfill two goals: first, investment in producing
works that are public goods, and second, the publication and
dissemination of the work. But statutory rights are not the only rights
that exist in literary and artistic works. By virtue of being the work's
creator, the author has a property right in the work that the law ought to
protect if promoting progress in science and the useful arts remains the
goal of the copyright system. Recognizing the author's ownership of
the work as a product of his creative personality will encourage
authentic authorship as a productive activity. When the law protects the
author's personality, the law expresses intent to protect a work as a
thing owned by the person who created it-giving its creator the liberty
and freedom to create works with greater authenticity, integrity, and
reliability.
The effect of the distinction between property and privilege on legal
analyses of copyright questions is significant. Protecting an entitlement
to use the work as a privilege to use allows for consideration of
reasonableness in determining whether the conflicting use amounts to
an infringement of the entitlement-a conflicting use must be an
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the entitlement
before the use may be enjoined. The law on land use nuisance
demonstrates the requirement for reasonableness in the use of a
resource. An injunction may be granted for a nuisance that is a
substantial, intentional, and unreasonable interference with the use of
another's land, or if the substantial interference is the unintentional
result of negligence, recklessness, or abnormally dangerous activity,194
and courts are inclined to balance two competing use rights in deciding
whether to enjoin a use that causes substantial harm. 195
Treating statutory copyright as an economic privilege with several
use rights-rather than a property with a possessory right to exclude-
shifts the law's focus from infringement of copyright with every use
that is contrary to the rights under § 106 to a consideration of how
informational resources may be put to their best use considering the
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1977).
195. See Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 684-85 (N.C. 1953) (involving
interests of an oil refinery and neighboring private landowners), abrogated by Boldridge v.
Crowder Constr. Co., 108 S.E.2d 215 (N.C. 1959); see also Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz,
500 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) ("[E]ven though a jury finds facts constituting a
nuisance . . . there should be a balancing of equities in order to determine if an injunction should
be granted.").
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need to provide incentives and allow access. Incorporating this form of
analysis into the copyright system creates a presumption that social uses
of literary and artistic works are, as a matter of law, legitimate uses of
the work that must be balanced against a competing use to recover
investments in production and distribution of the resource. The fair use
doctrine, arguably, will no longer be an affirmative defense because all
social uses of the work would be presumptively fair, putting on the
copyright owner, as the plaintiff, a burden of showing an unreasonable
interference with their entitlement. An injunction will not necessarily
be granted for every use by the public that the law deems
unreasonable-where the equities require that damages be granted
instead of an injunction, the law may do so. 196 As a general rule,
copyright owners cannot exercise a right to exclude under the
entitlements granted to them under the Copyright Act.
This normative proposal also carves out a separate property right for
the author in the work that is protected as a matter of natural right. The
authentic expression of authors plays a significant role in promoting the
progress of science and the arts because authentic works of integrity
communicate reliability of content for the purposes of learning, study,
and research-activities that direct the growth and progress of society.
By protecting literary property, the law sets a standard of conduct for
the production and use of literary and artistic works that requires the
creation of works making positive contributions towards the betterment
of society in ways that do not undermine or disparage the integrity of
the work so that producing authentic works of authorship is reduced.
Protecting literary property, while recognizing the author's personality
in a work, is a related but separate issue from moral rights, which
protect the personal interest and integrity of the author. With literary
property, however, rights provide the legal system with tools to shape
social conduct and guide the production and use of literary and artistic
works towards progress of the sciences and arts. Authors are
encouraged to contribute in positive ways towards progress by
protecting their creative personality. Society is able to refer to norms of
social conduct in the use of literary and artistic works with the aim of
progress in science and the arts as a collective goal. The protection of
literary property must be regarded as a step towards establishing social
norms of conduct that generate creative activities geared towards
196. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970) ("[T]o grant the
injunction unless defendant pays plaintiffs such permanent damages as may be fixed by the court
seems to do justice between the contending parties.").
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society's advancement rather than an expanding system of possessory
rights to restrict access to works.
VI. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE LIGHTHOUSE
It is difficult, if not impossible, to calibrate the optimal balance
between protecting private rights in literary and artistic works and
granting access to information needed by society. Economic theory
suggests that the public nature of literary and artistic works justify
expansion of rights because externalities generated by producing
creative works should be internalized to prevent uncompensated uses of
creative works. American legal realism, on the other hand, resists
expanding property rights as an encroachment into the public domain by
industrial interest groups and a limitation of society's right to use
creative works for innovation and development. The tension between
private and public entitlements in literary and artistic works highlights
the need for a balance between private rights and public interest that the
legal system has yet to achieve. These conflicting approaches to the
copyright dilemma bring attention to the tension created by granting
temporary monopolies over literary and artistic works, and yet existing
approaches to the dilemma have offered limited normative guidance on
the treatment of the issues involved.
A doctrinal and institutional approach involving a deeper analysis of
our understanding of property law principles may provide a viable
solution to the copyright dilemma by suggesting that rights in literary
and artistic works are really two-fold: a right in rem based on an
author's property right in the work by virtue of the author's original
authorship that is good against the world, and an economic right in
personam to recover profits from the commercialization of the work
which stems from the statutory rights granted by Congress under the
present Copyright Act. The doctrinal and institutional approach to the
property rights-public interest dilemma described in this Article
arguably puts copyright jurisprudence on a more stable foundation by
allowing the law to evolve through legally accepted principles of
property law independent of the social, technological, and cultural
changes which constantly shift the delicate private rights-public interest
balance with ease. Analyzing the copyright dilemma through
conventional property law doctrines yields better solutions to a legal
system tasked with managing competing use rights in literary and
artistic works as a resource for progress.
Light from a lighthouse provides immeasurable guidance to vessels
traveling and maneuvering the seas at night. The provision of light is a
much needed service, which must be encouraged, because light, while
144 [Vol. 42
Rights, Privileges, and Access to Information
abundant in the day, is such an immensely scarce and invaluable
resource to seamen and vessels during the night. If lighthouse services
are privately provided, property rights become a necessary state-
provided mechanism allowing private lighthouse builders to recover
their investment and maintenance costs incurred in providing lighthouse
services. Yet these "property" rights are enforceable only for
recovering levies from vessels and do not entail a possessory right to
exclude vessels from using light from the lighthouse as a navigational
tool. It would be, first, physically impossible to exclude vessels from
using the light by any means other than turning the light off; and
second, even if turning the lighthouse off was an option to exercising a
right to exclude, it would be inherently immoral to do so when vessels
depend solely on lighthouses to navigate them towards safe land. These
state granted rights do not entail a possessory right in light but provide
an enforceable mechanism for recovering payment. Similarly, rights
provided under the Copyright Act to encourage producing literary and
artistic works allow only for the recovery of payment for use of the
information entail neither a possessory right in the information itself nor
a right to exclude society from having access to information. These
entitlements-economic privileges that are not confined to the physical
work protected-are tools that the law has to manage competing claims
to information. They do not preclude society from using the work and
lend legitimacy to society's claim to access information for progress.
Information, like light, provides the necessary guidance to those using it
and should not be protected with an absolute right to exclude. The
absolute right to exclude is only a right the author has as recognition of
personal autonomy and individuality, and is necessary to protect the
author's personality and integrity to ensure that works of authentic
authorship continue to be produced.
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